Next Thursday is Thanksgiving, I guess, and so I guess it won't be a class. And then the following Thursday I will be away. So the next class will be December 8th, which is the day we celebrate Buddha's enlightenment. And then so we are meeting on December 8th and December 15th. I guess that's it. I don't want to say dwell on this too much, but I get feedback that people are, some people are having difficulty with this material, which I'm not surprised. And I just hope that we can continue.

[01:01]

So we've been talking about, last week or two maybe, we've been talking about direct perception. And so direct perception is six types, basically. It's the sixth sense perception, five sense perception, and mental perception. and then those are the basic six types. But then there's also a way of looking at it as four types, which are the sense perceptions are one kind, mental perception is another kind, and then remember the other two kinds of direct perception, yogic direct perception and And what I'm teaching you about is that whenever you have a state of cognition, not just direct perception, but in all direct perceptions, there is also, like in a direct sense perception, there's also this apperceptive.

[02:25]

direct perception. So there's a non-conceptual awareness of color in the case of, let's say, the eye consciousness, a direct, unmediated, direct perception, non-conceptual perception of a color. And simultaneous with that is a direct perception of the awareness of the color. So all the direct perceptions are accompanied by a direct self-knowing perception. Most perceptions in our life are... all perceptions are non-conceptual and most are non-conceptual and non-deceived.

[03:30]

So, for example, again, direct perception of a color, most of the time it's non-deceived. The main time when it would be deceived would be if there's some kind of disease of the eye. So in that case, it would be non-conceptual. For example, if you look at something white, you might have some problem with your eye organ and see it as yellow or red or something. In that case, you would be deceived about what the object was. The object would appear red. but it would be appearing falsely, it's not actually red. And then also it would seem that the object you would be perceiving would be red, redness, but that would be a mistake.

[04:35]

The appearance is false, it's not really red, plus the perception of the appearance of red would also be wrong. So that would be a case of a direct perception which is not non-conceptual but wrong or both wrong about in terms of how the phenomenon appears and wrong in terms of what is grasped. So you're grasping something that's red, not there, plus also something red is appearing which isn't there. So both the appearance is wrong and and you think something that doesn't exist does exist. You're perceiving something that doesn't exist as existing. So you're both, you might say, deceived or mistaken, and also, I'd say, wrong. So most, so sense conscious, sense direct perception is true and undeceived most of the time.

[05:49]

So most of the time when you see a color, you see it the way it appears, you see it the way it appears, and the way it appears is directly related to the way it is. And also you don't mix any conceptions with it, so you see it as it actually is. Yes? The reason that it would be wrong is because right there at the center... Yes. Right. Right. The thing that's affecting you, because of your eye organ having some problem in it, you see it as a different wavelength. But it appears that way to you, but it appears falsely. Plus, you also are perceiving something that's not there, perceiving a color that's not there, or you're perceiving a wavelength that's not there.

[06:57]

So when perception is wrong, it's always wrong both ways. It's both wrong in terms of what's appearing and the object that's being engaged with. This actual electromagnetic radiation is coming to you, which is, I don't know, let's say blue, and you're engaging with an object, but it appears red, and you're actually engaging with this red appearance. But there is no red, and the appearance is false. So in direct perception, if one of them is off, both of them are off. But usually, neither one is off. Now, moving to, let me just say this before I move. There is a pretty much constant, there's a constant experience of this immediate perception going on all day long.

[08:06]

We're always actually having this immediate experience. throughout the day. It's our ongoing experience, our basic experience. However, this experience, without being reflected upon or interpreted, is not really significant, or you might say it's insignificant, or you might say not really meaningful. It is our basic experience, but it doesn't really have any meaning unless it's interpreted or reflected upon. So it's barely known. We're conscious, but this conscious is very rich, very alive, but we're not very conscious of it. Okay, now we move on to

[09:08]

indirect cognition, conceptual cognition, which is indirect. So it is by means of conceptions that we consciously respond to objects. So if you see, you know, the stop sign, I mean the semaphore, different colors, you see the color, like the red, and you actually can see the red and respond somewhat unconsciously. In other words, you don't actually think, oh, it's red, stop. Sometimes that happens, that you're actually stopping the car, you see the red and you stop the car, but you're not conscious of it, you're talking to your friend in the seat or you're listening to the music on the radio or something.

[10:12]

The light is red. You see it. You have a direct perception of the red. It's correct. It actually is red. So you're not deceived. The way it appears is red. It is red. And it's actually a true direct perception. And you step on the brake. But you're not conscious of it. And you can sometimes recollect that you weren't conscious of it. But by looking at the light and saying, it's red, or by having somebody else say, it's red to you, let's not get that into red now, but anyway, just you say red, then you can go from it's red which is a conceptual cognition of it, it's read or read or read to then step on the brake, respond to it consciously. So it is by means of conceptions that we consciously respond to objects that have been barely perceived by the senses.

[11:26]

barely perceived. Perceived, but barely in the sense of we're barely conscious of them. But by reflecting on them, we become more conscious. And as we're directly perceiving things, moment by moment, and we can directly perceive a number of things at once, but as we're directly perceiving colors and sounds and so on, and also mental perceptions, when those, and those are happening very rapidly, when those amass sufficient continuity, like you get enough, if you just had, like if you came to the stop sign and the red went off, and, you know, just one moment of red happened and then the stoplight went off, didn't go anymore, that one moment, you probably wouldn't be able to respond even to the color.

[12:33]

Get that? If you just had one flash, a very short flash of red, even though it's very clearly, you could even detect it touching, you know, affecting your eye and maybe detecting that some kind of brain thing happened in response to that radiation hitting your eye, the eye went off and something in your brain happened, you actually could register that there was an eye consciousness at that moment, there was a perception of it, and actually even identify it was a correct perception. If it was just one of them, almost no one would be able to step on the brake. But when that light goes red, just in a second, there will be many, many reds coming into your eye. But if it actually was so fast that it would be equivalent to one input, almost normal people would not be able to see it.

[13:40]

It would be subliminal. You have to have several before the sense, there's enough sense, direct sense perception to be enough to make a step on the brake. But even that's still not conscious and very conscious. But after that happens, then there can be also a mind consciousness of that, but still barely aware of it. Just one moment of it, barely aware of it for most people. And then there can be a conceptual cognition. And this conceptual cognition, just one moment of that actually, because you got the word, is enough to be able to, if you hadn't stepped on the brake already, to step on the brake based on that one. And also, you're just more conscious of it. So, again, having our sense perceptions going on all the time, once they're sufficiently strong,

[14:46]

there's been enough of them, so we're actually like registering them enough to respond, then there is this tendency to bring in conceptual cognition. In other words, there's a tendency to think about our experience, our basic sense experience. There's a tendency to think about direct perceptions that we're having. We're having direct perceptions all the time when they're of sufficient strength even if they're not sufficient strength, there's still a tendency to think about them, but you can't think about them until they get to a sufficient strength. They have to be a sufficient strength for the conceptual cognition to be able to get at them. But the conceptual cognition is always waiting to get at something, to interpret and think about something. And usually we don't have any problem. Usually we have plenty to think about. Now, one of the reasons, well, I could say, one of the reasons why we have this constant tendency to want to think about our experience, so we've got experience, we've got experience, we've got experience, but we don't just have experience, we like to think about it.

[16:03]

We're not saying we like to. We feel we're compulsive about it. We compulsively think about our experience. So I can say one of the reasons why we compulsively think about the experience is because when we think about it, it becomes meaningful. Another way to put it is that we're compulsive about having meaning. We don't feel comfortable going very long without having a meaningful experience. So if you're actually in a state of direct perception a long time, it would be unusual because you would be experiencing, you'd be alive and everything, but it would be unmeaningful. So that's hard for us. So that's one way to put it. The other way to put it is this tendency wants to act and this tendency comes up with meaning, this tendency to conceptualize the direct perception.

[17:07]

So again, this tendency to think about or interpret our sensations, which are the basic experience, is very strong. And, of course, it's through this kind of conceptual activity that all of, for example, this talk I'm making right now, it's through conceptual activity that we have teachings about the nature of mind, through conceptual activity that we have teachings, systematic and unsystematic teachings, about the philosophy and psychology of mind and physics and chemistry and music. All this stuff is a result of conceptual activity. Now all this is just, you know, so far in some ways it's just that psychology, but then the in some sense the particularly Buddhist part comes next is that there's a type of cognition which is wrong cognition, which sees something.

[18:28]

It sees something, some experience happening. It looks at the experience, the direct perceptions, it looks at them and it sees something that isn't there or sees something that is there as not being there. And this type of wrong conception is the source of all kinds of disturbing emotions which lead to the types of action which lead to suffering. Direct perceptions really don't cause disturbing emotions. It's what we call wrong conceptions, which are conceptions where you actually are conceiving of something that's not there or conceiving of something that is there as not being there.

[19:34]

And the prime example is For example, we perceive permanence in what is impermanent, or we perceive a self where there isn't one, or we see that there's no consequences of karma when there is. So we see that there isn't any consequences when there is consequences, or we see there is a self when there isn't. These misconceptions these cause afflictive emotions which then lead to actions based on those afflictive emotions which lead to suffering. Huh? Afflictive? Afflictive, yes. They're uncomfortable in themselves, but they're not as uncomfortable as the consequences of the actions which we take based on them. So, for example, when you feel hatred towards someone, or you feel fear and then hatred, then the actions you do on the basis of the hatred, those cause more suffering than just the hatred.

[20:51]

Hatred's pretty bad, but the things you do based on it. I mean, a moment of hate can be very uncomfortable and have big consequences. but killing somebody. But the consequence is don't put you in prison for the rest of your life or kill somebody for the rest of their life and destroy a whole family or whatever. You can cause your revenge in war and all that. So the actions we take based on these things really substantiate and establish the suffering Okay, so perception is basically receptive and non-reflective. Direct perception is receptive and non-reflective.

[21:54]

Cognition is basically responsive and reflective. So direct perception, we receive the data and know it. Yes. No, no. I'm talking about two kinds of cognition so far. Two types of cognition. One type of cognition is perceptual. The other type of cognition is conceptual. Percept, concept. Perceptual cognition, perception, direct perception, is receptive and doesn't reflect, doesn't think about what it just receives without thinking about it. And again, that's most of what's going on all the time.

[23:01]

It's this direct receiving of data and knowing it. Receiving, receiving, and receiving in a way that we're stimulated, our sense organs are stimulated, and then awareness arises. And there's no reflection, there's no conceptual mediation. But conception, it doesn't really exactly receive much. It's supported by things, but it's not very receptive. It just immediately is responding. It's responsive and reflective. So that's one way to distinguish between these two basic types of cognition. And you can say all cognitions are one of these two types. All cognitions are either direct perceptions or conceptual cognitions.

[24:03]

And once again, immediate experience is constant and without interpretation or reflection, but it's not very meaningful. But by interpreting it or thinking about it with conceptual cognition, it becomes meaningful. That's why we're drawn conceptual cognitions is because meaning is part of our existence. Okay, now there's another way, another distinction between these two basic types of cognition which completely exhaust all types of cognition, and I just want to review the perception again in terms of its causation. So direct perception has three primary conditions, which are dominant condition, object condition, and immediately antecedent condition.

[25:29]

Those three. And so for sense consciousness, the dominant condition is the organ. the object condition, the physical data that stimulates that organ, and the immediate antecedent condition, the previous perception or, anyway, the previous cognition, whatever it was. It could be possibly a a conceptual cognition. But anyway, the previous cognition, those are the three primary conditions for the arising of sense consciousness. And then mind consciousness, slightly different, it has three conditions also, except what? What's the difference? Hmm?

[26:32]

What? What's in the mind? The perceptions in the mind, too, in sense perception, the perceptions in the mind, and mental perception, the perceptions in the mind. What's the difference in terms of the conditions, the three conditions? Yes? Pardon? Right, that's the difference. In the case of sense perception, the dominant is the physical sense organ and the antecedent is a previous cognition. But in the case of mental cognition, the dominant is the previous cognition because what acts as the organ for mental perception is the previous cognition.

[27:36]

The dominant condition for a sense consciousness is a physical organ. The dominant condition for a mental perception, a mental perception is the previous cognition. The previous cognition acts like an organ for the mind consciousness. And so that the dominant condition and the antecedent condition are the same thing. An object condition for direct perception is actually an object. And it can be a mental object or a physical object. Yes? What's your name again? Cat? No, not a memory. No. It's like the previous cognition is what is like a...you're not actually thinking about that cognition, it's just that it's a support so that this can be a cognition.

[28:45]

There has to be a previous...first of all, the previous cognition has to get out of the way, but second of all, it's a support for the present cognition. It acts like an organ for the mind consciousness and for the other one it's just a support. For the mind consciousness, it's both an antecedent support and like an organ support. So the mind organ has the same definition as the antecedent condition. So the organ of the mind, the mind's ability to act as an organ for itself, is the previous cognition. So mind uses a previous cognition as a way to know things, as the organ by which it knows things. And this is really like a strange idea. But anyway, there it is. Yes? Could you give an example of how that would work? Like, you have a cognition, and then how that becomes the dominant condition for the head with no perception.

[29:58]

kind of abstract. Oh, this is abstract. This is abstract. To some extent, it's like Let's say the previous cognition before this mental cognition was a sense cognition. And not just a sense cognition, but maybe several of them. So to have enough continuity so that the mind organ can rise. And then the last one is a kind of knowing. It's where consciousness knows an object or consciousness has an object. OK. And there's awareness of blue. OK. That's the previous cognition.

[31:02]

And that previous cognition kind of like shows something about the nature of cognition. It's a cognition, so it acts as an immediate antecedent condition in the sense that it's a cognition from which another cognition can arise. It's just the fact that a cognition has happened becomes a point of support by being right before another cognition so that a cognition can have the consequence of producing, of supporting another cognition. But the organ side of it is that the cognition actually is an example of cognition. Right? And the mind can use the example of the cognition as a way, as an organ for itself. It's like a model or almost like, yeah, it's like a model or almost like a ghost of the previous cognition, which sort of gives the present mind a template or a model for its own activity.

[32:17]

So it's not like, I thought you were saying that it colors the next one, like then it changes your perception of the next one. No, let's say that there was a direct perception of blue, and that goes away, and now there's a rising of a mental perception, and the mental perception could also be of blue. But it wouldn't be that the blue was coloring the conception, I mean, the mental perception. It would be that the blue was what the mental perception knows. But the fact that the previous moment was knowing blue, that wouldn't influence the present moment to think of blue.

[33:18]

It influences the present moment by supporting it in these two ways. It supports it as a dominant condition. It acts like an organ for it. And it also is immediate antecedent support. But the object is the blue. And the object isn't coloring the consciousness. The object is what the consciousness knows. But the consciousness is, in a sense, colored. In a sense, we are colored by all three conditions. So in a sense, we're colored by the conditions. because they're what produce us, us cognizers. Just a second. Yes? A question that's been on my mind in regards to our study of perception. I'm trying to figure out what the relevance is to Buddhism. Are we looking at points at which we know how we suffer, how others suffer, through that slippage that happens between perception and conception?

[34:29]

I'm just trying to get a sense of where we're going. in one sense, the most important item that we've run into in terms of motivating the Buddha way is these wrong conceptions. They're sort of the reason why we need this practice. Okay? The fact that we misconceive, the fact that we imagine that things, we imagine that things aren't there aren't there. That's the reason why we need to study the mind, because we suffer because of that thing. But when we start studying the mind, we don't just study the wrong conceptions, which are the main problem. We study the whole thing so we can understand and get over the wrong conception.

[35:30]

improperly and believing our improper perceptions, we need to study all of mind. I think. Otherwise we wouldn't understand how our misconceptions were misconceptions. We need to understand that our delusions are delusions. But in order to understand that, we have to also understand states of mind which aren't deluded. And not all states of mind are deluded. For example, direct perceptions are deluded. undeceived and correct most of the time. And some conceptions are also, as I'll say in a minute, all conceptions are mistaken but they're not all wrong. So just for example, if you look at somebody You're basically mistaken about them when you look at them through conceptual cognition because what you look at is a person, but what appears to you is the image which you project onto the person.

[36:45]

So what you're seeing is a superimposition of an image upon this object. So you're mistaken about what the object is because the object looks like it's the image which you projected upon it. So you're mistaken. But still, if the person moves across the room, you maybe can tell that they move and you can go with them and say that's the same person. And if the person's there, you can say they're there. And if they're not there, you can say they're not there. But if you look at somebody and you have an image of a of a self in the person. That image is not, of course, the person, but also there's nothing there corresponding to the image. When I look at you, there is something. I am engaging with you when I look at you, but what appears to me in conceptual cognition is an image of you. But when directly perceiving you, I don't see a self.

[37:54]

And so that's not actually causing much trouble. However, that's not enough by itself to refute the misconceptions. I think maybe I should just go a little further in conception to give you a little bit more foothold on conception. So part of the reason why I reviewed the perception a moment ago was because conception has different causation. So in perception there's three main conditions, three primary conditions. There's more than just three. There's actually four conditions, and the fourth condition has lots of other causes and conditions in it, but there's three primary ones which I mentioned. Now when it comes to conception, there are just two conditions, two primary conditions.

[39:00]

And the two primary conditions are the dominant condition and the immediate antecedent condition. It doesn't really have an object condition. There is object condition, but it's not primary in this case, and I hope you'll see quite soon why it's not primary. In addition, these two of those three, conceptual cognitions are mental states, are mental cognitions. Conceptual cognitions are mental cognitions. So like mental perception, the dominant condition and the antecedent condition are basically the same thing. So for conceptual cognition, the organ is the previous moment of consciousness, just like the mental perception. And the immediate antecedent condition is also the previous moment of consciousness.

[40:08]

So it really just has one condition, which is the previous moment of cognition, which serves as organ and and immediate antecedent condition. The object condition is not very strong in the case of perception, I mean, in the case of conception. And the reason for this is because whereas in sense perception The object condition is strong in the sense that the object, that we perceive an object by the force of the object. Of course, we also have to have the organ operating. But the reason why we perceive that object rather than other objects is by the force of the object in sense perceptions. Whereas in mental conceptions our cognition is not primarily due to what's out there, but due to our subjectively determined predispositions.

[41:25]

Because what we do in the conceptual cognition is conceptual cognitions are cognitions that are mediated by an image. So it's not so important to us in this case what the object is, because what's important is what image we come up with to superimpose on the object. . No, it's not an illusion. It's an image. It's a fantasy. It's not an illusion. It's an image. It's just a picture or an image. It's a sign. It's whatever, you know. It's not an illusion. It's a fantasy, yeah. this so again unlike perception conceptual cognition unlike perception unlike perception conception does not apprehend the object through the force of the object

[42:59]

it apprehends the object primarily due to the force of its subjective disposition. So again, in direct perception, if you have visible data in an eye organ and this just deceased state of consciousness, those conditions produce the visual consciousness. But in conception, like for example, conception quotes, this is color, is an intentional reflection upon the object that's already presented to the mind by the visual sense consciousness. So you have a visual sense consciousness arising, or several of them, they're arising, and they're presented to the mind. So what the mind is presented with these sense consciousnesses have happened, so they're presenting themselves to mind, okay?

[44:06]

And then there's this tendency to interpret what's happening, to think about what's happening. So now the mind looks at this cognition which arose from color, organ, and previous cognition. Now you have this sense consciousness there. The consciousness looks at that sense consciousness and puts an image on it. And the sense consciousness is presenting the knowledge of the object. So the object's there. The knowledge of the object's there. And then there's an image of the... of this thing. So you have a conceptual cognition like a visual cognition. And then you have a knowledge looking at it in a way that puts an image on it.

[45:10]

So that's what conception is looking at. And what image it puts on is coming from subjective predispositions, not from the object. But the object is being presented. There is something there. in many cases, in what you might call not wrong mental cognition, conceptual cognition. Okay. So then there's another distinctive point about conceptual cognition, and that is that It apprehends the object. And the object, its object is, for example, a color. It apprehends the object, which is a color.

[46:12]

And this color is being presented to it by what? Huh? No? Huh? The object is the color. Primarily. So when you have these three conditions, let's say you have a sense perception of blue. So now there's a sense perception of blue. There is a subject which has an object called blue, or not called blue, a subject which has an object blue. Now the conceptual cognition comes and now it has this object there, but it has the object as presented by the previous cognition. And it puts an image out by which it apprehends this cognition

[47:21]

by the image. It uses the image to apprehend this previous cognition of the blue. And usually, often, it's right. It says, it's blue. So knowing blue, there's knowing the object blue, and then that cognition of knowing the object blue becomes the object which the conceptual cognition says, it's blue. Quotes, it's blue, or whatever. And the key ingredient here, the important ingredient, is that conceptual cognition cannot tell the difference, cannot distinguish between the conception by which it apprehends this information about a real sensory perception, an actual color there. It can't tell the difference between the image and the object. Can't tell the difference between the blue and it's blue, or blue in quotes, blue in quote.

[48:26]

It can't tell the difference. They're mixed. And this mixing, this inability to separate them or tell the difference, is similar to it takes the object blue to be the image blue. It takes the blue to be, quotes, blue. It takes the actual blue to be the fantasy of blue. It knows through fantasy or fancy or through image and ideas. That's how it knows sensory data. So it's mistaken, even though it's right. It's blue. Now, if you looked at the blue and said it's red, then it would be mistaken because you'd have an image that had the idea of red on it, and you'd think that the idea of red was the thing, which it never is, but you'd also be wrong because you'd be seeing something that's not there as there.

[49:32]

So that would be a mistaken cognition, a mistaken conception, and all conceptions are mistaken. And the mistaken... Because the way things appear to them is that they are the image by which we grasp them rather than the thing itself. So they're all mistaken. But not all are mistaken and wrong. So if I say that's Linda, I'm mistaken the way I'm seeing her because I see her as the image of her and that's not what she is. That's not what she is, but that's not how I'm directly perceiving her. But I'm just mistaken, but I'm not wrong. But if I say Linda's got a self, then I'm mistaken and wrong. And I like this example of...

[50:35]

And this is really a rich example, but I'll try to give it to you, see if you can cope with it. One is that it's an example of somebody who's short-sighted, looking at a hillside or something, and it's kind of blurry. And then they put glasses on, and then it seems clearer to them. But they are actually having the experience of the hillside. It's just that it's hard for them to name it. They're not even sure it's a hillside. But maybe they see it's a hillside, but they don't know if there's trees or grass or what's up there. Put the glasses on and say, oh, it's trees and grass. So it seems clearer. But it's very difficult when you have the glasses on and you see the clear hillside. It's very difficult to tell the difference between the lens and the image that you're seeing. I mean, not the lens and the image. Yeah. It's difficult to tell the difference between the lens and what you're seeing.

[51:41]

They're mixed. They're confused. What's out there is not what's in the lens. Some people are happy about what's in the lens, And some people even say it actually is like that out there. But it's really not. The lens creates an artificial version of the hillside which we like. But it's hard to separate the lens from the hillside once you're looking through the lens. Now, if you take the lens away and look at the hillside without the lens, then, of course, you don't have to separate the lens because you're not using it. You're looking directly at the hillside. So in conceptual cognition, once you put an image on the thing, it's hard to separate the image from the thing. Once I put an image on you, it's hard for me to put the image aside and see you. And usually I don't even see you anymore, I just see the image. But actually I did see you before I had the image.

[52:47]

And I do see you simultaneously with having the image. I also have a direct sense perception of you. At the same time, I have a mad conceptual impression of you. So if you leave the room, I can tell that you left the room. And then if I have conceptual cognitions of you, then they're like just images of you. which you might say are associated with memory, or memory makes possible for me to keep dreaming about you after you leave the room. But I know you left the room, unless I have wrong conceptual cognition. Yes? Can you have direct perception after you've had an experience? She said, can you have a direct perception after you had a conceptual perception? Well, you will continue to have direct perceptions. But the point is that when you have the conceptual cognition, you can't separate.

[53:54]

The conceptual cognition does not have the ability to distinguish between the actual object and the image. It doesn't have that ability. That's the problem. OK? Yes? Pardon? What ability? I don't think we have that ability when the conceptual cognition is on. Yeah. I don't know most, but anyway. There's a lot more direct perceptions than there are conceptual cognitions, I think. Because there has to be a lot of direct perceptions in order to be sufficient to stimulate and support a conceptual cognition. I don't know how many times more there are direct sense perceptions and conceptual cognitions, but I would say, let's just say 95% of what's going on is not being conceived of.

[55:08]

most of what's going on you could say inconceivable but i would just say most of what's going on is not being conceived of in the sense of conceptualized just for example just here's an example If you look at the number of angstrom units in the wavelengths in what's called visible light, there are 7 million different wavelengths in the band of visual light. I believe it's 7 million something. Okay? 7 million. Got it? 7 million. Got it? But nobody has 7 million colors that they see. OK? Among those 7 million, we have, some people have like, like some artists or something have like 225 colors, maybe. Ordinary people have like, depending on their age and so on, but some people have like 6 or 45. You know?

[56:13]

But nobody has 7 million colors because nobody has 7 million color concepts. But there are 7 million colors. I shouldn't say 7 million colors. There are 7 million opportunities to come up with colors. And what most people do is they put like 2.3 million colors under blue. I shouldn't say colors. 6.3 million wavelengths under blue. or 600,000 under red or something. And those things are affecting you. All the different color, all the different wavelengths are coming in, you know, including the gamma rays and the x-rays. But there's a certain part that we're set up for. For some reason, we're built this particular wavelength we're real intimate with. And then the ones right before and after were sensitive, too. Like, you get hot from the ones that are longer. Is that right? And you get burned from the ones that are shorter. Is that right? The shorter ones are the ultra-violent and the longer ones infrared.

[57:19]

The longer ones warm you up and the shorter ones burn your skin, right? So we actually can sense those. We don't see them, but our skin picks it up. Enough on that for now? So we do have direct perceptions all day long. And you do respond to them, and you can be trained to respond to colors like blues. You can be trained to put all these colors under the heading of blue. So when blue goes on, you ring the bell or something. You can be trained that way to learn that, to put all of them in a certain category and learn where other people are putting them and so on. And those are direct perceptions and there's no mixing. But once there's mixing, you can't unmix it in the moment. That's the nature of that kind of cognition, conceptual cognition, is it's mixed up.

[58:21]

It's mistaken. But mistaken cognition in the form of conceptual cognition is necessary because we got it. human society and Buddhist teachings and language are based on it. Without it, you can't have language. And you can't have instruction bringing people's attention to it or direct perception. But just let me say a little bit more about cognition, I mean about conception. Oh, there's two kinds of characteristics of things. One is the characteristic of the particular thing, which is called its own characteristic.

[59:24]

Another kind of characteristic are called a general characteristic. So for example, with colors, each color, it's not color because it's not color until you perceive it. Each piece of sense data, like each wavelength in this band from 400 to whatever number of octum units it is, each one of those wavelengths You know, each time a color comes, it's one of those. And that particular wavelength is particular to that particular color. And each smell is that smell and no other smell. And each sound is that sound and no other sound. Each thing has its own particular quality. Each hillside has its own particular quality. But it's usually like when we look at the hillside in terms of direct perception, we see this extremely rich thing out there. which is not that clear. And part of the reason why it's not that clear is because it's a unique experience.

[60:28]

We have no idea of what it is. I mean, I shouldn't say we have no idea, but before you put an idea on it, this hillside has never been seen before, so it's not very clear. You can barely figure out what it is because it's this rich new experience. This is the life of direct sensory experience of the world, a unique experience. visual sense, smell, touch, taste, experience. And that's what direct perception works on, these direct, unique things. And then we have the general characteristics of things, like the general characteristic of all those colors is that they're blue. The general characteristic of all those sounds is that they're harsh. The general characteristic of all those smells is that they're roses. One time my wife said, would you come down to the garden with me at Green Gulch?

[61:29]

And I don't know if she said, look at the roses or smell the roses or what she said. But anyway, she was going down there to interact with the roses, at least visually and olfactorily. Those are the two main ways that she had in mind. And so I went up there and I smelled the roses. And I knew what a rose smelled like. So I smelled a rose. And I was kind of like, OK, thanks. Let's go home. But she wanted to keep smelling. So I smelled rose after rose after rose. And the more I smelled the roses, the more I got into how all the different, the more I smelled the roses, The more I got into somehow getting in touch with how each rose was different. Now, my awareness of how they were different was a conceptual cognition. But there was different roses and different rose smells, which is the base of this conceptual cognition of the different smells. The direct perception doesn't say different.

[62:33]

That's the conceptual sense. But the direct perception was giving me information so that I could say, oh, that was different, that was different, that was different. And I didn't have words for all those different smells, but the more I smelled those different smells, the more awake I started to get. So that, you know, there really is something called aromatherapy. That if you actually get into, like, actually experiencing those different smells, it wakes you up in a wonderful way. But I actually didn't have concepts for all those different things. All I had concepts for was different, [...] and rows. Rows, rows, rows, but different, different, different. I could tell the difference, and I could conceptualize the difference. But I didn't have the concept. I couldn't use my concept to actually get those differences to happen, because they weren't just conceptual. There was actual sensory base to the sense of different, different, different.

[63:35]

Something was telling me they were different, and they were. And the richness was far beyond what I could conceptualize in terms of the difference because each one was also different. As you know, sometimes if you smell a rose and then smell it again, that's another difference, right? The same rose, not to mention switching roses. So anyway... You can't, when you're conceiving, you can't take the lens off. You can't separate the lens from what you're seeing while you're looking through the lens. You can take the lens away and look at the blurry scene again. Another way to put it is when you see a clear scene, you can't remember what the blurry one looks like. When you're actually seeing the clearness, you can't see the blurriness. So when you see the general characteristic of the thing, you can't see the specific characteristic of the thing. When you see the general characteristic of a person, you know, like, that's him, [...] but actually each Philip is a different Philip that I'm perceiving.

[64:43]

He's changing right before my eyes, constantly changing, but all of them kind of like are Philip, like this general thing, Philip, Philip, Philip. And that Philip, Philip, Philip that I'm putting on this person I can't see the actual changing person because the image is dominating. The image keeps being mixed with actually what I'm seeing there. If he leaves the room, I know he left the room. He's actually there making it possible for me to put this image on him. But I can't supplement my image of him, which is a general thing, Philip, on the specifically constantly changing unique thing, which I'm also perceiving, but barely. It's very blurry, you know. And part of the reason why it's blurry is because it's so rich. It's not simple packaged Philip. It's just, you know, it's not clear. There's this company called Sharper Image, right? The image is sharper than the thing. The image of Philip is sharper than Philip. Philip actually is

[65:44]

extremely you know too rich to be sharply focused but we don't like that because then that would be what what was the meaning of this constantly changing bubbling you know constantly transforming philip it's hard to signify that so i put this i got this nice little general philip which i put on here and so when you're looking at the general characteristics of things That's what direct perception is doing, plus the conceptual cognition is looking at the general characteristics of each person, plus you can't separate the general characteristic image from the rich uniqueness of the moment. You can't separate them. You can't separate them, and you can't tell the difference. You can't distinguish them. They have to be together because one's the base of the other. So you really can't separate them, but you can't even distinguish them. And in fact, you take the sharper thing first and let go of the wonderful, blurry, direct thing.

[66:45]

Philip? I don't think you can see if it whops off or if it blunders off. Just acknowledging that we're seeing the world or events or data through lenses and we can't really strip ourselves of the lenses, but we can acknowledge that we're seeing things very closely. Yeah. Yeah. You can't strip yourself of them, but without stripping yourself of them, sometimes you don't even put them on. So most of what's going on is we're not using the lenses. It's just that that part of our life is insignificant and blurry. We barely know it. And we respond to the un-lensed richness of our life. We're responding to it all the time, but not very consciously. When we put the lens on, then we can consciously respond, then we can talk about it and so on. It's always mistaken, but often correct.

[67:52]

So, for example, my i'm i'm not incorrect about thinking that you're philip or that or that you're in the room still that's not that's right you know you do exist and i think you do but the way my mind apprehends you the way you appear to my mind is through my image of you which actually is not you is not the way you are So my conceptual cognition of you is mistaken in that way, but it's not mistaken as long as when I see you in the room, you're in the room, and when you leave the room, I don't think you're there. Then it's not mistaken doubly. It's deceived but not wrong. But if I see a self in you, Then I have an image of a self which is not there and also there's no basis to it whatsoever. Whereas my image of you is based on this person who is nodding his head and would agree that he was nodding his head and is smiling now. But the way you're smiling is constantly changing and they all fit under smile.

[68:58]

I have a general Philip. I have a general Philip smile in which all these different smiles can be put in. And when I had that image, I can't see all the variation in the actual smile that's behind my image of the smile. But I like the image of my smile because I know it so clearly. Yes? Yeah, the separate self would be another image. which you could put on there too, but I'm not wrong about you being Stephen, but I am wrong. I'm not wrong about you being Stephen. I think you exist and you do. I'm not wrong about that. But I misapprehend you because I apprehend you as the image of you and I can't see that it's Stephen that's not my image of you. Now, when I'm apprehending you through the image of you,

[70:04]

then I'm conceptually cognizing you. But I do also spend some of my time apprehending you, not through the image of you, but through the actual sensory impression of the light bouncing off you. I also do it that way, but that way is relatively unconscious vis-à-vis my sharp image of you. But the image of a self, which I can also project on you, there's no basis for that whatsoever, If I know when I see the self on you that it doesn't exist, then the image appears, but I don't believe it. Then I still have a conceptual cognition, which is mistaken because I have two images. One is image of self, plus I have another image that's false. So both of them are not the reality of the actual thing over there. But at least I don't any longer believe that there really is a self over there. I know, I learn, finally, that there is no self existing over there.

[71:11]

So it's possible for conceptual cognition to be wisdom, even while it's mistaken. And as Philip was saying, even from now on you can just know that basically all day long what you're generally conscious of in terms of clear images is images, and the images are obscuring or confusing or mixed in with the actual sensory input that's coming to you. The sensory input is coming to you, you do know about it, and that's how you know where to put your images. And you do make mistakes once in a while, but most of the time they're right. But there's a certain kind of thing you do which is always wrong, and that is when we put selves on things or when we put permanence on things. Those are always wrong. Then you have a double whammy. You're mistaking the thing for the image, and the image is of something that's not there at all, like the image of permanence, not there at all. But the image of a person or a woman or a man, there is a woman or a man there.

[72:19]

But the way they are is much richer and specific rather than the general image that you put on them. But you can learn to remember that you're putting these images on things, and you're waking up when you start doing that. Cara? I have a question and a comment. . So I'm using two different ones. Mistaken means about, you're mistaken about the way the thing appears, and wrong means about the existential status. So is the only correct the direct perception? I can have a, what do you call it, a mistaken but correct conception of you. The correct conception of you is that I think you're Kara, and you agree, and everybody else agrees, and I don't think you're an elephant.

[73:33]

In other words, I think you exist. I think what I'm interacting with is Karo, but I'm mistaken in thinking that the image I have of you is you. Because it could also be that I have a mistake of myself. Oh, it's the same. Nobody, it's not so much you have the wrong image, it's just that you mistake the image for the thing. Image is not the thing. And we do that towards ourselves and towards others. That's the way all conceptual cognitions are wrong, is we mistake the image for the actual object. They're all wrong that way. However, they're not all wrong in the sense that you imagine that something that's not there is there. And that's a dynamic process. getting new data. I mean, it's like we have old data and we also have new data. It's a totally dynamic process.

[74:35]

Right. And the less you see the dynamism of it, the more you're falling for the image of an undynamic world. And we generally speaking, conceptually, when we conceptually see things, we start to turn the dynamism down because we're seeing things generally rather than dynamically. And it's hard to put words on dynamic situations. And it's hard to have meaning when the dynamism is full blast. So we slow things down by putting them in little boxes. However, simultaneously, we're still going ahead in this very dynamic situation of getting new data all the time and perceiving it. So the dynamism is happening, and we're in touch with it. But we don't be so complex and rich that we We hardly know it. It's almost insignificant. So we like to make it significant. So we generalize it with these images and then it's more significant and more graphable and we can talk about it and more conscious, you know, and we can respond to it more and we can reflect on it, we can think about it.

[75:45]

But we have to put an image on things to think about them and reflect. But we have to put an image on things to think about them and reflect. For example, in direct cognition, even though you're looking at impermanent phenomena and you're actually responding to impermanent phenomena, this is happening, it changes, this is happening, you're actually in there with the impermanence, you can't think that's impermanent. Even though you're directly looking at the impermanent, you can't think it's impermanent. Whereas when you look at something, and put it, even if you put image of impermanence on it, and it's right, it's still the image of impermanence is not the impermanence. So you're right that the thing is impermanent. That's correct. But the way it appears to you is as the image of impermanence. And similarly, if you looked at someone and you said the image of no-self, that would be right. But you confuse the image of no-self with the actual no-self. So if I say mistaken conception, it's really redundant.

[76:57]

It's always mistaken, but not always wrong. So if I actually see you and conceive of you as impermanent, I'm not wrong. You are impermanent. And I'm conceiving you as impermanent. I'm conceiving everybody as impermanent, dynamic organisms. Okay? That's not wrong. That's right. You actually are impermanent, dynamic organisms. But the image of impermanence is not actually your actual impermanence. That's just a nice image so I can say impermanence, impermanence, impermanence. I have to put an image on you of impermanence to remind myself to meditate on impermanence. But in the meantime, I'm dealing with the impermanent person all the time, moment after moment. It's just that I'm barely aware of it. So this is, you know... It looks like you're getting the picture a little bit here. Thank you for, you know, hanging in there.

[78:01]

I know this is hard, you know. So anyway, it's... And here's a reading list, and... I would say that on this reading list, the book, there's a book in there called Buddhist Logic, and there's a book in there called Mind and Its Function, and there's a book in there called Mind in Tibetan Buddhism. And those in particular you might want to look at if you can get them through Zen Center and bookstore somehow. But anyway, you don't have to get the books. Are there particular chapters? Yeah, start at the beginning. The first chapter is the best chapter to start with. Mind in Tibetan Buddhism. Buddhist logic. And then the other one is... And you might not be able to get these books before next class, but I'm just telling you, on the list, those are the ones that are... And also another one is called Dignaga on Perception.

[79:08]

So you, it's on Dignaga on perception. So Dignaga is the one who actually is a source of this analysis. He's an Indian master in the 6th century. Anyway, if you want to do a reading, so I don't know, just see what you can do in the next two weeks and I'll see you on Buddha's Enlightenment Day, okay?

[79:34]

@Transcribed_v005
@Text_v005
@Score_84.52