In Minnesota, I read the April 15th Economist. And in the letters, the first item was kind of a pun called conflict of opinion. And again, opinion is kind of the root of the word dogma. Dogma is something held to be an established opinion, often held by an authoritative person in a religion. A former editor of The Economist said around the time he resigned that he felt that armed conflict has increased in the period since the US law of wars, which dominated his early years as editor of the magazine The Economist.

[01:23]

And this person writing says, in fact, conflict has not spread and the world has been getting steadfastly, he says safer, but I would say steadfastly less violent. I'm not saying I would say that, but I just don't like that word safe. The total number of wars declined by a third during Mr. Emmet's, the editor's time as editor. and the number of battle deaths . Although economic expansion is certainly one of the explanations for this trend, another reason is that the global response to conflict is improving peacemaking by the UN and others has helped put an end to old wars about twice as fast as new wars start.

[02:29]

Moreover, consider the rise of global justice. Dictators who butcher their people are now less likely to enter pleasant retirement on the Riviera. The latest example is Charles Taylor, Libya's former president, who was recently transferred by blue-helmeted guards to the UN special court. So he's waiting for trial and, you know, the other people that are waiting for trial. And I'm not reading this to you exactly to tell you that this shows that violence is decreasing. The person who wrote this is David Harlan of the United Nations Department of Peacemaking Operations, New York. And I particularly noted this because Jane told me she heard on the radio something like that a while ago, but she didn't have a source.

[03:45]

People often tell me they think things have never been as bad as they are now. And I don't usually argue with them, but I usually say, well, I don't know if that's so. It seems like things have been bad in the past, but I don't know if I can assess whether they're worse now. They're certainly bad in a lot of ways. I don't think anybody would question that. But just to let you know, I'm not saying this also to make you feel like, oh, everything's okay, but rather maybe that they're being made and that they're somewhat successful and we could perhaps support these efforts and maybe they're not totally futile. But more important than that is, I think, just that, you know, who gets to say whether it's what it used to be or not as bad. So here's just somebody who's saying from his position in the UN, he feels that in the last 20 years, anyway, there's been a decrease.

[04:54]

I think that... I don't know if there's a decrease or not, or an increase. But whether there's a decrease or increase, it seems like the job's pretty much the same job to me. But that's just my story. I don't tell the story that the world is increasing worldwide. I just tell you the story that Mr. Harlan says it is. And if anybody knows of another source that's saying that violence is increasing since the breakup of the Yugoslav states, I'd be interested to hear what the source of that information is. We certainly know violence, but is it increasing, leveling off, or decreasing? We know there's lots of domestic violence. Is it more than it used to be? I don't know. But still, if it is more, then perhaps we should work harder to find something to address it.

[06:02]

And then there's another thing in here which is called student pedagogy. And the person who wrote this letter said, when I was 15, I conducted a survey in my school. ...to rank their teachers, and then I asked the teachers to describe what they thought made a good teacher. The teachers who the students ranked best said... The teachers who the students ranked best said that if students want to learn, they would learn. If they didn't, they wouldn't. Those are the teachers that the students thought were best. Does that make sense? The teachers whom the students ranked worse had very elaborate theories as to what a teacher should and should not do in order to be a successful teacher.

[07:14]

The correlation between how much responsibility the students bore for their grades according to the teachers and how good the teachers were according to the students was almost perfect in that survey. And I thought, okay, so now, did you get that? The correlation between how much responsibility, between the view of how much responsibility the students have and how good the teacher who has that view is is almost perfect. So the teachers who think the students have more responsibility are the teachers who think they're better. And I think there's, what do you call it, I think there's a lot to be said for viewing the students as responsible in the process.

[08:18]

That doesn't mean that the person who views them as responsible is really a good teacher. It just means that in this study, the people who look at students that way are seen by the students as good teachers. They might not actually be good teachers. Students might like teachers as responsible people, rather than think of them as irresponsible people. And then they should figure out some way to make them responsible, or find up some way to teach irresponsible students. Because it's their responsibility, because they're the teacher, and the poor student is there without much agency, without much response. They don't have the ability to respond. And even a person might understand, and maybe they're right, that really it's tremendously important that the student wants to learn. Because if a student wants to learn, even if it's a bad teacher, they'll still learn, I would say.

[09:25]

But that doesn't mean that if a teacher really thinks that if the students really want to learn that they will learn, and they're right about that one point, they might be lousy at what they're teaching. But even if they're bad at teaching, the students will still learn. Like if they're bad at teaching math, and the students want to learn, the students will learn that they're bad at teaching math. so they'll be a good teacher. That's my opinion. People might have the opinion that if the students really accept the responsibility to learn, and the teacher understands that that's really very powerful, the teacher might also be good at teaching something. but maybe double the subject. But it also may be that bad teachers are just as important.

[10:26]

So-called bad teachers who don't know anything about their subject are just as good for learning as good students. Like Niels Bohr used to think that whatever anybody said to him was correct. And then he would just go from there. And he often was forced to the conclusion, after working with the assumption that they were correct, that they were not correct. Which takes a lot of work. This has some application to something, probably. Now, I kind of... Is that connected? This is mobile, right? So, I wanted to move from epistemology to psychology, but... I just can't bring myself to do it yet.

[11:34]

So, in this chart... Some people are asking, what's the difference between the vertical and the horizontal? I think the only difference between the vertical and the horizontal is, generally speaking, the vertical doesn't have anything to do with, doesn't have much to do with different qualities. Whereas the horizontal has to do with epistemological quality. So the lowest epistemological quality is over on the right side and the highest over on the left. So these are varieties, different epistemological qualities or levels of excellence. Whereas these down here are more like different categories. So the first two categories are conception, I mean perception, those two categories vertically.

[12:42]

Perception and conception. Perception and conception, yeah. So those two, in those first two pairs, include all types of cognition. And then horizontally, so all, under the first line, There's nothing said there about the quality of the perception. It just means perception includes all the perceptions. So all the different major qualities of perception you'll find horizontally becoming more and more accurate and excellent as you go west or left. And the same with conception. And then similarly, you'll have different categories, but there's really no gradation, I think, going vertically, and there is horizontally.

[13:52]

In the next pair, sensory-mental, I think that also is completely exhaustive of all states of cognition. But again, there's no gradation under sensory, and there's no gradation under mental, vertically. The gradations we'll see by looking horizontally. So conceptual, excuse me, sensory cognitions are, so you have, are what type of, in terms of the above two categories, you see the first two categories, perception and conception. Perception is what type? Perception, right. Mental cognition is what type? Both. Yeah. Mental cognition can be both. And under mental cognition, you see that you can find mental cognition under all the different varieties. Mental cognition, there's all those different varieties that are listed horizontally can be mental cognitions.

[15:09]

All the different varieties listed horizontally, however, are not always mental cognitions, as you can see by looking on the line. Some of them can be sensory cognitions, four of them. But all seven can be mental cognitions, because mental cognitions can be perceptions or conceptions. And if you look at, aperceptive and non-aperceptive are also a pair that are exhaustive. of all states. However, even though they're exhaustive of all states, those two, one has more variety than the other because apperceptive cognition can only be direct perception. However, that apperceptive cognition goes with every non-apperceptive cognition.

[16:20]

So every cognition, and there's two types, you could say, perception and cognition, every perception is accompanied by a direct apperceptive cognition, a direct perception. But every conception is also accompanied by apperceptive cognition. every non-perceptive conceptual cognition. But again, non-perceptive is what you would usually think of as a cognition, a cognition which knows an object. And the object is apprehended by the subject. And the object can be can sometimes be a subject. Not all objects are subjects. In other words, not all objects of cognition are cognitions.

[17:21]

Is that clear? Alenia? Can you give an example of an object of cognition that's not a cognition? You can? When do you think you'll be able to? Eventually. That's right. Susan? A table? A table, yeah. A table is not a subject, but it can be the object of a non-aperceptive cognition. However, it's not the object of a non-aperceptive cognition. The aperceptive cognition would cognize the subject which knows the table. Okay? So anyway, this whole, and then, yeah, and then there's another important category is valid cognition and non-valid cognition.

[18:21]

And they also, all cognitions are either valid or non-valid. Divine valid? Did I not give you a sheet on valid cognition yet? I have not yet given it to you? Okay. Yeah, next week I'll give it to you. But anyway, valid cognition is... Well, this is a definition I'll give you. There's some debate about this, but anyway. The one I'd offer you is, it's a cognition which is basically... and new. And what? And new or fresh. Fresh. So, and now, you look over there under, for example, under perception, top first line, there can be wrong perceptions.

[19:43]

In other words, where you're perceiving something which doesn't exist, Gave some examples last week, like perceive a circle where there's not a circle, where somebody just takes a flame, maybe not a flame, but incense or a glowing rod and swings it around, and you see a circle, but there's not actually a circle there. So you perceive, your mind engages with something that's not there. That's a wrong perception. A wrong conception would be to see something like a glowing rod, said the same thing, but not moving, not holding still even, that it's substantially existent, that it's independent of its environment, for example, or that it's permanent.

[20:51]

Or what? Or that it's permanent. That would be seeing this thing and thinking that it's permanent. And that would be seeing something that's not there, namely a permanent rod. That would be a wrong conceptual cognition. Or seeing a person and thinking that they have independent existence. That would be a wrong conceptual cognition. Now, if you move from the wrong perception horizontally to inattentive perception, that would be where you would see, for example, a red color or a glowing ember. You'd see it. And the thing there is a glowing ember, and you'd see it as a glowing ember. And that would be what we call a true perception. In other words, you're perceiving something that's there.

[21:57]

And also, since it's a perception, what it appears to you is also the way it is. So that's a true perception. Is that sound? Yeah, inattentive, right. It's true. It's true. If you have an inattentive perception, and it was... and exists, then it wouldn't be listed under inattentive. It would be listed under wrong. Inattentive perception means a perception of something that does exist or that has come to be, you could say. It exists, some dependent core that actually has come to be and you perceive it. And it's true. It's actually there and you perceive it as there and the way you perceive it is the way it is. But you don't know it. consciously, it's inattentive. In other words, you don't ascertain or comprehend.

[22:59]

Direct perception is, for ordinary people, the vast majority of direct perceptions, which we're having and which are true, are inattentive. We don't know about them. But they're working, they're doing some important work. They're the basis of everything we are aware of. It's an example of that, like I was riding over here across the bridge and I had one of those like a minute where my mind was just thinking about something and I had no... I got there, but obviously I didn't actually... I was doing, I was responding to the environment from driving my car. Yeah, and it would be all the more obvious if you somehow realized that you had changed lanes several times in heavy traffic, but didn't even notice it. People can also, like, I don't know, dance with somebody, do some very complicated dance or some very complicated musical piece or gymnastic thing, and they know it well enough so they can be daydreaming while they're doing it.

[24:14]

But obviously, they were responding to a constantly changing sensory situation, and they were accurately perceiving what was going on, and basically none of it was ascertained. can't tell you a thing about it, and you could take a film of them, and you could see that they were totally taking in all this information, and people were like, or they're like a juggler, and people were throwing them new things, taking them on and responding to it skillfully, and then they didn't attend to anything. Now, it's also possible that they would attend to it. Yeah, but we're talking about inattentive, and that's a correct perception. So we don't put Mistaken perceptions under inattentive. And then there's... Which box are you talking about? Are you talking about the top? The top line. So are you talking about that box or the top line under inattentive? Yes, so inattentive perception, I think you'll see all of them will be... It says inattentive perceptions, so all of them are going to be perceptions.

[25:23]

We don't, generally speaking, have inattentive conceptions. Conceptions are what we usually do ascertain. Commonly, ordinary people do ascertain, do comprehend, do ascertain. I shouldn't use the word comprehend. Do ascertain clearly that they're having certain conceptual cognitions. Okay, now I'm on the track to explain valid perception. See, go all the way over to the right side. Perception will be, it could be the same example of a color or a tactile sensation like heat or a taste like sweet. But in this particular like piece of candy or whatever, the first moment when you taste the sweet accurately, it's true,

[26:28]

Like the inattentive cognition is true, like you taste the sweet there too. You correct it's a sweet taste. You're right. You're not tasting something as sweet which isn't sweet. You're right. It's true. But it's not just true. It's also valid because not only is it true, but you ascertain it. You comprehend it. And you comprehend it in a way that is irrefutable. You're complete. You know clearly, and nobody can talk you out of it, including yourself. If you can talk yourself out of it, or somebody else can talk you out of it, like a Buddha, come in and say, okay, that wasn't sweet. Okay, boss. Of course you would say, okay, boss, but that you're just humoring him out of respect for the boss. which you might also have a valid perception of.

[27:31]

But anyway, and number two, it is the first time you have that taste. When you have another example of that same taste, basically, a moment later or whatever, it's not called a valid perception because it's not fresh. However, still, not just true, But it doesn't have the power of the first one. So then you're saying sweet, but... I'm saying sweet, but, yes? At the conception, so it wouldn't be sweet. No, no, no. There's some fresh taste that you wouldn't have a word for. You wouldn't say it's sweet, but you would, you know, just like you can test people to see, give them sweet, give them sour, and then give them sweet again, and see if they say it's the same as that last one.

[28:32]

It can be verified whether they tasted it or not. And also it can be verified whether they tasted it or not. Even though you give them sweet, and the second time they guess out of six possibilities, they guess it's sweet again, if they don't have this kind of valid cognition, they can be shaken out of it. Now, the, what do you call it, the That's the logical issue here. The issue of liberation and salvation here is that, for example, you can perceive, have a direct perception of an impermanent object. You can directly perceive an impermanent object. Matter of fact, that's the only kind of object you ever directly perceive. You could also perceive, I think, somebody could play a trick on you, and you could perceive a permanent object.

[29:39]

Wrong perception, a wrong cognition of the perceptual kind. It would be possible to set something up so it would look like something was independent of the rest of the universe, you know, to play a trick on somebody. To do some kind of magic where, like, perceived directly without any conceptual mediation, mentally or sensorily, they would directly perceive something that doesn't exist, a permanent phenomenon. That would be a wrong perception. That make sense? That's pretty difficult actually, but... Usually, always, your best buys are at Cregan. So, every direct perception is of an impermanent phenomena.

[30:47]

There's no direct perception of permanent phenomena except the wrong direct perception. Every true direct perception is of an impermanent phenomena. But most direct perceptions, which are true, and are impermanent phenomena, are not ascertained. We do not actually directly ascertain clearly that we are perceiving impermanent phenomena. All day long. Pretty much all day long. When you actually ascertain an impermanent phenomenon, and know that you're ascertaining an impermanent phenomenon. You do not yet know that it's impermanence that you're ascertaining. But you're... And you actually know what an impermanent phenomenon looks like. And if somebody would show you some other kind of phenomenon that looked differently, you would say, that wasn't what I saw.

[31:49]

Now, the most important... Buddha is up in the upper left corner and that would be the direct perception of impermanence and the direct valid perception of impermanence and of not-self. However, The majority of Buddhist epistemologists will tell you that without first having a direct perception, I mean, a valid conceptual cognition of impermanence and not-self, you won't recognize directly the impermanence and selflessness of phenomena. So again, going horizontally under conception, wrong conceptions.

[32:59]

This means, wrong conception means basically, again, the same as perception, when you're perceiving, when you're conceiving, when you're conceiving of something that doesn't exist. Again, like a permanent thing or a thing that has a self. Or, you know, a student who has graduated from college when the student hasn't graduated from college. If you look at a person who hasn't graduated from college and you perceive them as a graduate, there's no such person. That's a mistake. Cognition. But all conceptual cognitions, although they're not all wrong, They're all mistaken because they're all confused because the image by which the conceptual cognition apprehends its object is mixed so that it looks like the image is the object.

[34:04]

So all conceptual cognitions are faulty to some extent. And some are wrong. So the conceptual cognition of a permanent thing or a self is wrong. of an impermanent thing, or the conceptual cognition that somebody, a person is impermanent, or a person doesn't have a self, that conceptual cognition is true, but mistaken. That the person you're looking at is an impermanent phenomena, and that's the way you conceive of them. You look at the person, you see impermanent person, impermanent, but this is not inattentive. You actually can see, you know, you're conscious of seeing the person and you're conscious of them as impermanent. The idea of their impermanence, the image of their impermanence, the idea of the concept of their impermanence, you mix it with the person who is impermanent.

[35:10]

Is that clear? No? Can you ask a question? Is it correct belief? It could be. I think that would be more like correct belief. But another possibility, which I think I mentioned last week, is you could look at somebody and you could think... Certainly some children do think that their parents... I mean, they do believe that their parents are permanent. They look at their parents, their mother, for example, or father. Those are two examples. And they think that the person is permanent. They also think that lunch is permanent. That's why they want the same lunch every day. And if you try to change it, it sometimes can be a big problem.

[36:11]

Now, if they want to change it, it's different, because then they're changing. If they want to change it, then forget about permanence. But when they want permanence, that means they believe something can be permanent, and they want you to go along with that. And if you don't, they get very upset. But they actually believe that their father or mother is permanent. And if the father or mother makes a choice to set up without consulting with them, without warning them and making a game out of it or something, they can get very upset. Because they actually have wrong conceptual cognition that the parents are permanent. As they grow up and hear about various things like aging, they still think their parents are permanent. As they hear about Buddhism, they start to think, well, maybe they're not. Maybe them dying means that they're not permanent. even like before they're dead, that they're not permanent.

[37:18]

In other words, they start to have doubting or indecisive cognition. So indecisive cognition, you'll see, that's a conceptual cognition. Also the children think, and this one, you know, adults also have, that childlike adults also think that people have a self. So that's a wrong cognition. But with education, both children start to doubt that people have a self and that they're permanent. That's a positive evolution in the kind of cognition. However, it's not yet a valid cognition. It's not a valid source of knowledge. It's a non-valid source of knowledge. However, it is no longer categorized as false. Direct perception, however, does not move into this category of, what do you call it, doubting or indecisive.

[38:30]

That only applies to conceptual cognitions. Only conceptually do we start to consider, maybe not. Perception, you know it and you don't ascertain it, or you know it and you do ascertain it. You don't, like, wonder about it. You don't doubt it. Yes? Yes? I have a question about direct perception. Do we ascertain it? I remember you explaining it two weeks ago, that we actually don't really ascertain an object because it's already gone at the time we know it. I remember it being like that. So I wonder what ascertainment means, because we don't know it conceptually. There's no concept there, but how do we know it if it's actually not there? That's a very important question, but I think that it will derail the tenuous hold that some people have in this conversation.

[39:37]

Okay, but keep it. Please ask it again someday. Okay? then conceptual cognition can involve another step where you actually do think you conceive of things as impermanent. That's the way you know people. You kind of know they're impermanent. You know they don't have self. You basically believe that or think of them that way with the aid of a conceptual cognition that actually that's the way you start conceiving of people as impermanent, selfless beings. However, both that and the previous level of conceptual cognition are both true conceptual cognitions. True but mistaken because in both cases you're confusing the way you see the person as mistaken.

[40:42]

You see the person as a an image which looks maybe like it's not permanent, and now you see the person as an image of what somebody who's impermanent looks like. But you believe it. The next step is you skip over the subsequent cognition, where now you conceive of the person, and you conceive of them as impermanent, and for the first time at some point, you are absolutely sure. And never does any kind of image of them as being permanent ever sway you at all. And now you actually have an irrefutable, valid cognition of impermanence or not-self. Yes? What accounts for crossing that threshold where there's no more doubt?

[41:43]

Well, what accounts for it is a lot of study and examination and reasoning. You don't get that way without actually really working with the teaching and arguing with yourself over your correct belief, which is a belief which you're not very sure. And you can test that it's not very sure, and other people can test it's not very sure, and we normally do. in our conversations by noticing where we're rigid and self-righteous and, you know, we're actually acting like we really don't, we believe it, but we're not sure. But it is a correct belief. To go that next step is, that's a big part of practice right there. Huge step from that to the next. Yeah, that's also called valid inference, right? It's a valid conceptual cognition. The first time, Now, you have that correct, that valid inference, that indirect knowledge.

[42:47]

It's an indirect knowledge of anything, but most important would be an indirect knowledge of impermanence and not self. It's conceptual, yeah. So, the first time it happens, it's that's a valid conceptual cognition. But it could be something other than those things, but those are the most important examples because that example goes with what's over on the right-hand side of the chart. the extreme right second row, that x there should be red or green or something, because that's the source. That type of wrong is ignorance. I'm sorry, I'm not going to tell you, it's a secret. Wrong conceptions are not really a big problem.

[43:57]

But this... What did I say? What did I say? Wrong conceptions are not a problem. No, I was mistaken. Wrong conceptual cognitions are the problem. Wrong perceptual cognitions are not much of a problem. You're mistaking me, Rowan. But mistaken ones are? Wrong and mistaken are the same. Yeah, sorry. So the extreme right, second row, that is the type of cognition which really causes us problems in our life. And that one is first completely by the extreme left on the same row. Yes. Wrong conceptual cognition is overturned completely by valid inference, valid indirect cognition, valid conceptual cognition.

[45:17]

Those are synonyms. Yes? Yes? So if you take an example of something like something sweet that you were talking about through soil, say a child eats something sweet for the first time, then at some point they have a conception or cognition that it's sweet. Is it possible to have a valid influence of a particular food? And then you can have a subsequent cognition of the same food, right? And then whether you have the same food again and again, I'm just wondering. I'm just trying to pick it up. Well, the example you picked, we can use it.

[46:33]

That would be an example where you would start with the child would taste something sweet. And that would, for most people, start out as if it was something sweet and they tasted it. you know, and the taste was that it was sweet, they taste the sweetness of it, that would be, for most of the time, adult or child, that would be a direct perception. It would be true because they're tasting the sweet, they know it's sweet, but they don't ascertain that it's sweet. Okay? Now, it's possible that they would have quite a few of those sweet tastes in a fairly short period of time. I mean, you know, in terms of, like I mean, like linear time, like in a second. If you put something sweet in your tongue, you can get many, many chemical reactions in a second. So that could give rise, it's possible, to many moments of sense perception of the sweetness.

[47:38]

Each one person or child is not attentive to, they don't ascertain it. Following the force of quite a few of those, it would be possible to then have that followed by a mental perception of the sweet. Perception doesn't depend on the tongue for this perception, but it's a direct perception. And it depends on antecedent condition of that sense cognition of the sweet, plus the sense cognition is also its organ. And in that way you would have this direct perception, direct mental perception of sweet. If that's strong enough, then that can be the antecedent condition for a conceptual cognition, which then would know consciously as, oh, it's sweet.

[48:45]

And it would be right, it would be true. So the mental perception would be true, all those sense perceptions would be true, and the conceptual cognition would be true. Okay? However, that's not the same as valid cognition. it could be like doubting. You could be kind of not too sure if it's sweet. So it could be a doubting conceptual cognition, but you'd be aware of it, but just kind of unsure. Are you familiar with that kind of tasting of something sweet? You think probably it's sweet, but you're not sure. But you are aware that you're tasting something, that you're working with a taste here, And you might also be aware that it's a touch because tastes are often, you're actually touching the liquid, right, the chemical. So, or you can be pretty sure that it was sweet.

[49:45]

So still in a valid cognition. When you would be able to know that it's sweet irrefutably, then you would be having a valid cognition of a sweet Then, just as there was a series of conceptions before, there could be subsequent conceptual cognitions. Following the directly valid conceptual cognition, there could be succeeding ones where you're equally sure. But there was a first conceptual cognition that was irrefutable. And that changes your attitude about this particular experience. which makes, you know, you're absolutely sure. So you were right all along, and now you're sure. So when you doubt the permanence of things, you're right. When you doubt the permanence of things, you're right. You're correct, but you're not sure.

[50:48]

So you haven't even gotten yet to really believing that things are impermanent. When you get there, that's a correct belief, but you're not sure. When you're sure, it's a beautiful moment in your life. Then it is possible to move from there to see the same phenomena, but not through an image of it, to see impermanence directly, which you were doing all along because you were looking, you're always looking, except looking. So selflessness is not like this. So impermanent phenomena is generally what we're looking at, and they're all empty. But emptiness is not an impermanent phenomena. But we're talking about impermanence here. So when you actually conceptually ascertain that something is impermanent, you've made a major step in your practice and this is what actually is enough.

[51:50]

Actually, Nagarjuna calls this bodhicitta. The arising of bodhicitta. He with the valid conceptual cognition of impermanence. It's not enough to sort of like correctly believe the teaching of impermanence. Valid cognition of it. That would transform the person from that time on. That type of knowledge would change the person's lineage. You would then naturally have this intention. Your intention would change at that point. And then you can move from there to perceive the same quality of all phenomena, of all compounded phenomena that are impermanent, without using the image.

[52:52]

And at the source of building up this conceptual cognition, you are seeing this You had the direct perception of it as a basis, but you didn't know. And then, because of that, you came to have a conceptual cognition, which you did ascertain. And then that evolved, and you ascertained all those evolving conceptual cognitions, you ascertained them. And then you ascertained a correct, not just correct, the conceptual cognitions were evolving, correct, correct, correct, and now... irrefutable and the first time is the most important one. And then after that you know too. And then on you know based on that one. At least for this object. And you can do this with other objects or not. And then you could move from there to have a direct perception where you have the same knowledge, you're seeing the same object, namely the impermanence of something, of a taste, for example, without conceptual mediation, without the generality.

[54:05]

of impermanence. And that's the most powerful understanding of anything. Because originally impermanence is not the image of impermanence. Just like a taste isn't the image of taste. Yes? So is conception and mistaken cognition and image and false cognition is what? Image, mistaken cognition, conception. It seems to me like you're saying image is just mistaken. No. The image is just an image, but in conceptual cognition, you use an image to apprehend the object.

[55:08]

So like you see a color, there's a color out there, and when you know it conceptually, you use an image as a lens to see the object. But the image, you can't see the image as separate from the object, so you mix the image with the object. And in that sense, although you're correct that if you're seeing something that exists, it's a correct cognition. I mean, it's not mistaken. It's a correct conceptual cognition. I'm thinking of a pot. Yeah, like a pot, okay. Like here, here's a pot. If you're looking at that, it's, that's, but then you take a picture of it in your head, And later, when I turn my face and I'm trying to think about the pot, that's mistaken, right? No, when you go out of the room and you think of this pot, then it's not really mistaken because you're just thinking of the image.

[56:09]

You don't think you're seeing the pot anymore. You know you're not seeing the pot. Right, but that image is mistaking conception. In that case, you're just imagining and you know you're imagining, so you're not really mistaken. But when you look at this, like right now, most people are looking at this and they have an image of it by which they're apprehending it. But I'm also looking at my hands and I can feel the heat of the pot, so I can... I mean, isn't it closer to direct when your eye is meeting the object versus images of the object? When it's not in your visual... In order to have a conceptual cognition of this pot, you need the pot. I mean, because you... I should say, in order to have a correct, a true...

[57:10]

conceptual cognition of this pot, there has to be a pot. If there's no pot, and you have a cognition of the pot, and you really think that there's a pot, you think you're knowing a pot, then that would be a wrong cognition. Because you'd be conceiving of something that doesn't exist. But this pot is happening here. It is being here. So if you are conceptually cognizing this pot, using the image of this pot to know this pot, there is a pot here. And you're using an image of the pot, which you're making up, to get awareness of this pot. So that's an example of a true conceptual cognition, which you're aware of. That's true. However, it's mistaken in the sense, and maybe I shouldn't have written mistaken on this chart, Maybe I should change to wrong or something. But conceptual cognitions are mistaken in the sense that the image you have of this pot is mixed with the pot.

[58:21]

The pot doesn't look... The pot isn't really how it appears to you. How it appears to you in conceptual cognition is through the image of the pot. So in that sense, your conceptual cognition and my conceptual cognition as pot is mistaken, is confused. It's not wrong because there is a pot here. But if I destroy this pot somehow, you know, or change it significantly so that the image you have now wouldn't apply to anything anymore, and you actually thought you saw the pot, then cognition. But if you take what's happening right now and take it a step Let's say I'm in my car, and I try to recall this particular pot. The image in my car of this pot will not be as clear as it is while I'm looking at it.

[59:27]

That's right. And you would know from this class that you're not perceiving the pot. So it would be mistaken? No. It would be a mistaken conception because I have this image that's not accurate. Excuse me, all conceptions are mistaken. All conceptual cognitions are mistaken because the image you have of the thing is not the thing. If you're in your car and you have an image of the pot and you think the image of the pot is the pot, that's mistaken too. But in the car, you're receiving the pot. Whereas here, right now, can you see? Like right now, ready? You're perceiving the pot. Although you don't ascertain perceiving it, that perception you have in the pot is the basis of your conceptual cognition. Like right now, except for the people behind me, people can't perceive this pot anymore. You can think that it's back there if you want to.

[60:29]

It's that you're you know, business, but you're not perceiving the pot. Only Eileen and Sarah and Catherine and Jane. And I can perceive it because I'm touching it. And I am perceiving it. But you guys can't perceive it. You can't perceive it mentally. Unless you would read their minds, you can't perceive it mentally. You can't perceive it through your sense thing. But now, most of you probably got a direct sense perception of it, if you think there's a pot, if you now have come to a pot. But your awareness, most of you, of this thing, is that in that very short period of time you had quite a few direct sense perceptions of this pot, direct perception of this pot, true ones, and a correct, a true conceptual cognition of this pot. However, the conceptual cognition, which is quite vivid for you, and you ascertain, that's mistaken because there's an image of this pot mixed with this pot.

[61:39]

So in that sense, your conceptual cognition is mistaken, but it's not false. Anybody who thinks, who is perceiving, I mean, who has a cognition and awareness of this thing, conceptually, they're not wrong. They're right. So the mistake lies in that enlightened beings can actually, non-mistakenly, understand the pot, or know what the pot is? Even enlightened beings, when they know the pot, conceptually, they're also mistaken. An enlightened being can know the pot with... And that conceptual cognition, for a Buddha, would be mistaken. Yes, because that's what conceptual cognitions do. They all do that. For enlightened and unenlightened beings, when they use conceptual cognition, they're using a mistaken form of cognition. Even though it's correct, it's still mistaken.

[62:42]

If it's conceptual and it's not just mistaken because its image is mixed with it, and it's a cognition of something that doesn't exist, then we call it wrong. And that would be the same for direct perception. They wouldn't be using an image. They would just be directly perceiving something that's not there, like a circle when there's not a circle, or a color when there's not the color. But they wouldn't be using the image, so they wouldn't be making the mistake of the image being the thing. They would just both be the way it appears to them and the way it doesn't exist. A circle's not hitting them. But an enlightened person, when they use conceptual cognition, they also are mistaken. But an enlightened person can use conceptual cognition as a way to talk to people, because you have to put concepts on things in order to use words. Yes? If you see it directly, you know it, but you wouldn't know what it is.

[63:47]

Because as long as you know what it is, then you already have a conception of it. Good question. But I think also maybe I shouldn't talk to you about this right now. Sorry. But... I think it's a little ahead here. It's a very important point and we'll talk about that. But not right now. Yes? When you say you're mixing an image with the actual perception, is the image of that... You're not mixing an image with the actual... You're mixing an image with the object as you're actually engaging with it. The way you're actually engaging with it. The way your body's engaging with the physical object in this case.

[64:53]

That's the perception. But you're not mixing it with the perception. You're mixing it with the object. Is this image of that particular pot in front of you or a pot-ness? Some previous notion you've had of pots, and therefore you say, ah, pot. The image is sort of like pot-ness, but not quite pot-ness. It's more like the pot-ness of this pot. But it is kind of generic. It's sort of potness, but it also, you can tell, within potness, you can also tell this pot from other pots, or the image of this pot from the image of other pots. But you use the same image. This pot's changing all the time. Each one of these pots, there's many pots that have been touched by this hand, and many hands have touched this pot. Things are changing, actually. There's a flow here. but pretty much the same image is being used.

[65:57]

So the image is on impermanent things. The image is basically, this is hard for people to understand, the image is not impermanent the way the thing is impermanent. It's kind of permanent. You can make new images, but each time you use one, it's not degenerating moment by moment. Yes? All conceptual cognitions are mistaken, ultimately. Not even ultimately. Right now. Okay. All conceptual cognitions. So everything that we're talking about, which is, because it's all conceptual, and it's all basic, everything, the diagram... It's not that what we're talking about is mistaken. Our knowledge of what we're talking about is mistaken. So... but not wrong, because some of the stuff we're talking about actually exists.

[66:58]

So it's not wrong, but it's mistaken, because we mix the images we're using to talk about things with the things we're talking about. But a lot of stuff we're talking about are dependent core risings that do have a fleeting existence before they change into being in the past. ...version of the same kind of generic thing appears. So it's not that the thing is wrong, but the way we are conceiving of it is wrong because the way the thing is, the way we're actually working with it is not the way we conceive of it. Our cognition is mistaken, not the thing. Our cognition of, for example, this brown clothes I have on you, your conceptual cognition of it is mistaken. But it's not wrong, because if you see this as blue, conceptually, you're right. It's true.

[68:01]

But you're mistaking your image of that with this. Did I say blue? Yeah. So that would be a wrong conceptual cognition. But this isn't mistaken. The fabric isn't mistaken. The conceptual cognition isn't mistaken. Now, if you saw blue fabric here, that would be wrong. If you see brown, that would be mistaken because it would be a true conceptual cognition. but mistaken in that the image you have of this is not present in this thing, but mixed with it. And that's how you have this nice clear knowledge of it. The actual way it's happening to you in direct perception, you don't ascertain probably. Except maybe if you got... would be able to ascertain your direct perception of the various colors of these things.

[69:06]

And in direct... If you had a direct ascertainable... perception of this, you would see all the different colors that are actually here. You would see moment by moment the color of this thing. Does that make more sense? Yeah, I guess what I'm thinking about is that in a way Is this whole grid work, the whole chart, all the different ways that we talk, ways of gesturing at something that we can't actually talk about because we can't conceptualize it accurately, or is that a leap? You can conceptualize accurately. A lot of the time you do. So, for example, if you conceptualize this as fabric of a brown color, that is conceptual cognition. This is fabric. and it is brown.

[70:07]

However, the way you ascertain this in this nice clear way, so you can talk about it and everything, is through the medium of the lens of an image of brown. And you mix that image with this. And the image is permanent. So this thing looks kind of permanent too, probably. Even though I'm moving it and stuff, basically, you're mixing the image of this, which is, the image is not the way you can use the same, basically the same image of cloth over and over, the same image of brown, or you can change it a little bit, but basically using generic things like cloth and brown to correctly ascertain that this thing exists. Is that why we think it's permanent? Is that why we think things are permanent? Because we have this permanent conception It may be that because images have this quality of being permanent, that we then even make an image of the apparent permanence of images, and then we apply that idea to everything.

[71:21]

That may be part of the causation of the mental construction of permanence. Maybe that's a reasonable story about how humans came up with the concept of permanence in an impermanent world. That first we had images which the mind created and the images aren't impermanent, they're mental constructions of something, you know, they don't change every moment. and use the construction over and over. Like I often mention, I have this construction of this image of Abraham Lincoln, which I've been using since I was a little kid. And I could draw it in a book. A lot of you would be able to recognize it. Maybe not somebody who grew up in Germany, but, you know. You know. You know. Who is that?

[72:22]

And if you don't know now, okay, all right. And if you say Uncle Sam, I'll just make him taller. But basically that works pretty much for eight-year-olds and people even over eight. It hasn't really changed that much. And, you know, you can change it a little bit if you want to, but it's basically not changing. It's just that there's that one, and then there's another one which doesn't change, you know, which works also. There's a wide variety of unchanging images which work. Talk about somebody who's dead. You're not an artist. That's it. I ascertained something there. But I know that whatever this person is, is not the image I have of her. I keep asking about vocabulary.

[73:30]

Can you give another word for ascertain? Comprehend. Comprehend, comprehend is more, a little bit stronger. Aware. Appear. Recognize. Recognize might be okay. Let's see, what else? You're attentive to it. Aware. Determine. Not aware because everything on this chart, this chart is totally, every X on this chart is an awareness. It's all different types of awareness. Differentiate. I think you could differentiate, but you wouldn't be the basis of a differentiation. Again, like in Laura's example, she's having all these inattentive perceptions, and she's differentiating between them in order to stay on the road.

[74:33]

But she doesn't know it. Her so-called consciousness doesn't ask. So things are appearing, but she's not really attentive to it. That's indeterminate. Hmm? Indeterminate. Well, you know, in a way, all direct perceptions are indeterminate. All direct perceptions. They can be indeterminate and ascertained. Whereas conceptual cognitions, one of the reasons why they seem more conscious is that they're determined, they're determinate. In conceptual cognitions, you identify the thing as this is blue. Do we think at that moment that blue is irrefutable? But it's not, because the only thing that's irrefutable is impermanence. I think you could have an irrefutable conceptual cognition of blue.

[75:35]

And the first time, there can be a first beautiful cognition that something is blue. As long as you didn't think that it stayed blue. Thinking that it stayed blue, or that the blue that you're seeing, this color, that was a permanent color, that would be a mistake. The concept of blue is permanent. That can be irrefutably a pot. There could be a cognition like that where it's irrefutably a pot without thinking at the same time that it's a permanent pot. But the key there is not thinking that it's permanent. So irrefutable and permanent do not... It cannot be together. I didn't follow that. It's irrefutably a pot, but it's not permanently a pot. No, you're right. So those two things, which sometimes I think I put together, can't be together, because the permanence of something would not make it imputable.

[76:45]

In a way, those would be two different cognitions. One would be the cognition that it's a pot. The other would be the cognition that it's permanent. That would be two different things. It could be a pot. You could... right about the pot, and you could be wrong about the copper, and you can be wrong about the permanence. But those would be three different cognitions in a way. You could put them together, too, but really they're three, I would say, because I don't think that the interjection of permanence on things wrecks the validity of, for example, that it's a pot. Or the interjection of self upon you doesn't ruin the cognition that you're Susan. Yes. So, just to clarify, if you have an irrefutable conceptual

[77:53]

cognition of emptiness, say, it's still mistaken. Correct. And... To have an irrefutable realization, you could almost say. It is a realization. Of emptiness, where you know it, and for the first time you know it, it's still mistaken. It's still mistaken. It's valid, though, and it's totally transformative. But until it's a direct perception, it's still somewhat mistaken. But it's necessary before the direct perception. It seems to be necessary. Even though it's mistaken, it's maybe more important than the direct perception, more transformative. No, it's not more transformative. It's extremely transformative. I mean, it's deeply, wonderfully transformative, but it's not more important because it doesn't talk about ignorance.

[79:02]

The story is not complete. It's a very important step, but until we have the direct perception, we haven't completely eliminated that misconception even. But at the time of the direct perception, we don't know that experience. Well, we don't know it the way we know the other one, but it is a form of knowing. Direct, valid perception is a type of knowing. This particular topic would be a way of knowing or realizing non-duality. because in the conceptual cognition there's a little bit of duality there, because of this conceptual mediation. Is all direct perception non-dual? Everything's non-dual, but not all direct perception. For example, directly perceiving blue is not knowledge of non-duality, unless it happens to be someone who has this other realization.

[80:14]

Then when they see blue, then they're perceiving the selflessness of blue, the non-separation of the cognition from the blue, and so on. All that stuff is there. But when someone has not had this understanding and they see blue, direct perception, even in a yogic state where they actually see the fleeting direct perception, they don't ascertain it yet. But they don't ascertain it with... this irrefutable, excuse me, even a direct valid perception of blue doesn't necessarily bring along with it the direct valid perception of its selflessness. That requires further training. And part of the prerequisite for it is probably training in Buddhist teachings about impermanence and selflessness. which you will take in conceptually, apply conceptually, realize conceptually, and then set yourself up for looking at that blue, which you look at and have direct perception of, direct valid perception of the blue, and now you have direct valid perception of the blue together with direct valid perception of the impermanence and emptiness of the blue.

[81:33]

So that's the highest state of knowledge. Yeah, I did. Right. They don't happen at the same time. Yeah, you can have a direct perception of the blue, which you clearly ascertain a valid first-time perception of a blue, at the same time have a direct perception of a self. However, at the time of perceiving a selflessness, you wouldn't see the blue. You'd see the selflessness. But through this specificity. It wouldn't be dependent on the blue because you're talking about the emptiness of the blue. But you wouldn't see the blue. You'd see the emptiness of blue. But it would be based on being with this actual impermanent, being right there, intimate with it. But now seeing its ultimate nature rather than its conventional nature. Now, Buddhas can see both simultaneously.

[82:37]

They can see in direct perception. the conventional blue and ultimate blue simultaneously. Other people alternate. I mean, no, who cares, right? Did Alan, you have your hand raised? Yeah, I was thinking of this word ascertain as this object which for the first time asserts itself on me. I have no language for it, but I know that something new is entering the blue. Yeah. Then when I... it doesn't exactly exert itself on you. You and it are interactive. You're also, your sense organs are doing too. And that interaction is the perception. And also that interaction is, that interaction being perception is also part of the understanding of how there's no subject-object duality. But it is... You could say it's impinging on you and you're impinging on it.

[83:43]

It's specifying the cognition, but you're also specifying the thing. That interaction is cognition and is perception. But I could also be aware that there's no antecedent for this. It's new. It's like... The pot has entered the room, but I don't have a word for it. I ascertain it. There's no antecedent for it. It only becomes a pot. You could know that too, yes? Yeah. But also... Yeah, you could know that too, but also you could... What? But there could be a first time you know it, which also doesn't have an antecedent. And there could be a second time you know it, which does have an antecedent. And by know it, it would mean that you'd know, of course, the same object, but you'd know this is another blue thing. Then I'm entering the realm of perception, right?

[84:47]

No, it could still be direct perception. It could be either. But for it to become a tie, it has to be a concept. No. Because it enters the realm of language. Pot is language. Pot is, yeah, but you can see a pot in direct perception. You can see your dad in direct perception. Is your dad alive? Wouldn't it be pre-language, though? Wouldn't it? Direct perception is pre-language, yes. It's non-verbal. But once it becomes conceptual, Yes, right. But pot, you don't need the word pot to see a pot. Right. You need an image to see it. You need an image. In direct perception, without using an image... He's not talking about that. He's talking about the conceptual part of it that's... Were you? No, I'm just aware that this object has...

[85:49]

is new in my consciousness, it's fresh. It doesn't have a name, it doesn't have a word, there's no concept behind it, there's no anesthetic behind it, I have no prior experience. I do know that it's there and it's something, it's something. You do, you definitely do, and all of us have this kind of life. where we're interacting with new objects all the time and we're new bodies interacting with new objects every moment. That's what a moment is, is when this body interacts with this world and the world and the body come up together and that interaction is perception dependent on this body. and the interaction depending on your body, your sense organs, and the same world I'm living in, basically, that gives rise to so-called another set of... and those are always fresh, arising, ceasing, all the time. I mean, every moment that happens. But, most of the time, we don't ascertain that.

[86:54]

But, so, for example, again, The body can interact with the world in such a way that electromagnetic radiation bounces off something and I become a person who is subject of the cognition of blue. However, if there's only one moment of that blue, and it's not followed by another kind of similar electromagnetic bounce off a similar kind of reflective surface, I will never know about that. But if they built enough momentum so that there is a mental cognition of that, then there can be a conceptual cognition of it. And then I know it's blue. But also, some people can catch that one flash of blue

[87:56]

Most people can't. But we catch a lot of them. That's how we have experiences kind of like this class and so on. Yes, Laurie? In the context of practice, do we get involved in any other, the accuracy of our self, besides selflessness and impermanence? Yeah, I think part of what we're doing in this class is getting more accurate about conceptions. We're learning about conceptual... We're getting more and more accurate about conceptions about different types of awareness. Different types and different qualities. about that, it seems like to me. Is it accurate that it's getting more violent or less violent? It seems like a lot of what I'm doing in my life is trying to get accurate in some way, having more accurate conceptions.

[89:07]

Sometimes that is in the context of practice, even though really, fundamentally, it's really about the impermanence of the self-discipline. What I think is difficult about this kind of material is it's kind of sometimes hard to see the relevance of becoming more conceptually clear about different types of cognition. which is epistemology, to learn that there's different sources of consciousness, different sources of awareness, and that there's understanding these different sources as a basis for practice, that's part of practice, is this kind of philosophical work. It's a little harder to see than when we're doing psychological work, but I don't want to keep people up too late, and it is kind of past nine, so we usually... And your questions are really important, but they're... Pardon?

[90:09]

Oh, yeah, but it was... I think these people... If I go over to your thing at that time, I think it was... How that happened. May I catch you if you stand. May I catch you if you stand.

[90:33]

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