Someone said to me yesterday that, something like, whenever he thinks of the Pinnacle of Arising, he's jumped for joy, because he knows if he could understand it, his life would be perfect. Anyway, that's true, and I thought that today I'd like to see if I can actually walk quite a ways into this chapter. I thought I might be able to perhaps kind of finish it in the next two meetings. So, the first karaka, actually the first few we've been discussing, but I'll read them. At nowhere and at no time can entities ever exist by originating out of themselves from

[01:05]

others, or from both, or from the lack of causes. So there's no essential, something doesn't arise out of the causal power of itself, of something other, of both, and also a lack of causes also doesn't have causal power. So he's basically, here he is saying that causation is empty, the process of causation is empty. And to say that the process of causation is empty, is another way to say that things dependently co-arise.

[02:07]

Dependent co-arising is the name of empty causation, and dependent co-arising is a rejection of causation in the sense of a causal power, an inherent causal power creating an inherently existing thing, and something that has an essence transmits that power into creating something else that has an essence. That kind of causation is rejected, and the emptiness of that story, the insubstantiality of that story is opposed. And that story which I just told, taking away the essence of it, is dependent co-arising. In other words, if you would describe some causal process where you have like this thing and then that thing, and that story is then emptied of essences, then that's dependent

[03:12]

co-arising. If you have essences causing things that have essences, if you have things with essence causing things with essence, then that's causation in the sense that it's rejected by Nargajuna, and that's not dependent co-arising. That's like that there really are some things out there in the whole universe, among all the things out there there are some things which for some reason have the power to create other things rather than everything together. Still, it's okay to look out there and say, oh, I see those things causing these things. It's okay to do that, to see these associations and regularities, that's all right. Because we do that, and it's fine to do that. But you can also see that that's just in some ways an arbitrary parceling up of the universe, some other beings looking from some other angle could see it another way, and from other angles could see it another way.

[04:13]

It's really not true that the world works that way. But if you can see things working that way, that's fine, you can describe them that way, that's fine, if it happens on a regular basis, fine, but contribute essences is what Nargajuna rejects. That's all summed up there in the first karaka. The second one, it says that there are four conditions, which, let's see, he calls primary, causal, hetu-pratyaya, appropriating or objectively extending, alambana-pratyaya, sequentially or contiguous, samanantara-pratyaya, and dominantly extending, adhipati-pratyaya.

[05:17]

These are the four, there's no fifth. Again, these are four classes of causation. So he's suggesting, and Buddhists before him looked over the field of possible conditions or causes, whether you attribute essences to them or not, and all the different varieties can be clustered into these four. If you want to study more about these, the root text that's available is Abhidharmakosha, chapter 2, starting, I think, on karaka, 62. I'd like to call on Tom at this point. Thank you. I wanted to give, maybe, I don't understand the difference quite between the ten conditions. Okay, let's see if I can do it.

[06:23]

Again, this is not, you know, a fixed way to do it. But, so, you might do it this way. You might say that the acorn is part of the... The first one, the first condition is called hetu-pratyaya. And under hetu-pratyaya comes a set of causes. And the set of causes, one of them is savagahetu, which is similarly caused hetu, similarly caused. Another one is sahabuhetu, which means coexisting cause. Another one is... Anyway, under that heading, you can put...

[07:32]

You said acorn, but I think you mean oak tree, right? Sure. So, you have oak tree. So, among conditions for oak trees are something similar to it. Other oak trees are part of the cause for oak trees. The acorn is... Is acorn similar to the oak tree? The acorn, under primary causal, comes a whole bunch of causes. There's four classes of causes under... I think there's five classes of causes under primary causal. And, so, the acorn could be one of those. And another one... Other things you can put under there are water,

[08:38]

warm, earth, things like that. Another thing that causes oak trees is previous oak trees, that are like it. That's part of the causation of oak trees, under this heading. That there were oak trees before oak trees, and that has something to do with... When I observe oak trees, the birth of oak trees, in my sort of story of the universe, I see that oak trees lead to oak trees. That's one of the causes of oak trees. Because it could take one. No, that's part of it. But another part of it is I wouldn't be able to recognize an oak tree if it weren't, you know, as an oak tree, for what it is for me. I wouldn't know it was an oak tree from a pine tree, unless there were other oak trees to say it was like that. So, that's part of the causal story that I might tell. So, part of the causal story has to do with the creation of different types of trees. Because the way oak trees...

[09:42]

That's a different condition, though. That's a different one. That's the one more like the... That's a lumina pragyaya. It's that I have an object out there, and for us to see the oak tree and experience the oak tree, it has to be an object for us. So, that's... I'm still not clear on how oak trees are just being... How other oak trees, apart from the oak trees, in terms of objects of which are related are the primary causal factors for that. I mean, I understand how oak trees produce acorns, but oak trees might have a primary... So, what I'm trying to say is that this is... You can tell a different story, but I'm just telling a story about... And then I'm going to try... He asked the question, right? He wants to know, what kind of causes would these be? Right. So, I'm just telling a story, and I would say, according to the story I'm telling, you can tell a different one, but according to the story I'm telling, that's how I would parcel up these different causes. So...

[10:46]

Well, maybe it's not clear... I have an understanding of what an acorn might be a primary causal, what water might be a primary... Maybe it's better for you to tell me the story of how you see acorns... I mean, how you see oak trees occurring, and then I'll tell you what conditions those are. That's another way to do it, rather than me telling the story, because my story might not be your story. I'm just saying, whatever story you tell about the appearance or the arising of an oak tree, and if you tell me the things that you think go with that, I'll tell you which... I'll try to put the parts of the story you tell me into different categories and conditions. That's all. Maybe it's better for you to tell the story than me, so that we don't have any argument about the story. Okay? So, if anybody wants to tell a story, and I'll tell you what conditions those are. I have another sub-question already. Are we still... You said the primary causal

[11:47]

comprises a set of causes, and then you started listing, like, similar and coexisting causes. Those are under primary causal. So, you're talking about the story of how the oak tree comes to be, and the story is still just addressing the first condition that we're in contact with. Correct. But, when Jeremy brought up something about my vision or my recognizing the oak tree, that brought up another condition. The alumina brought that up. Then another thing that has to be for oak tree to happen is that what was before the oak tree, which is not the oak tree, had to stop being. That's the immediate antecedent. Whatever there is that has to cease for an oak tree to happen, that thing or that class of things has to happen too. So, like if you have... Like baby oak tree has to stop

[12:49]

before big oak tree can happen. Pardon? That's a sequential, yeah. Sequential is... We're out of the primary here. Yeah. We're out of the primary. The... What the one is called sequential or contiguous, OK? Whenever anything happens, one of the conditions for it is that something else has to cease before it can happen. Because if something else is going on, that thing can't happen. Right? So, for example, the sprout has to go away before the sapling can happen. The sapling has to go away before the mature tree happens. This is just the way we tell it. This is... If you tell a story like that, like you tell a story, well, first there was an acorn, then there was a sap, then there was a sprout, then there was a sapling, and now we have an oak tree.

[13:49]

In that story, you have these conditions linked to this. You know what I'm saying? That's that condition. That sequential, contiguous, immediate succession kind of thing. That happens. We sometimes tell those stories. That speaks of that. The other thing that happens is that the fact that we... For us to have an experience of something, it has to be something we can apprehend as an object. Of course, we know about it. So that's the alambana pratyaya. Then the adhipati pratyaya is that among the myriad things that could interfere with something happening, none of them interfere. So everything else, besides the story you tell, the rest of the universe is in cooperation with this. All the stories you didn't tell, all the causes and conditions that you didn't choose to bring in to account for this, they all let it happen. That's the dominant thing.

[14:50]

That's most of what's going on is that this thing's just being allowed. And then we tell this little tiny story in the middle of the whole universe about what is happening. So that condition is nice because it shows that we have this rather trivial, arbitrary little story in the middle of everything that's going on about how things happen, but that's our little explanatory trip that we're on, our causal discussion, which we like to do. It's useful to us. And then the details of acorns, water, heat, blah, blah, blah, all that comes under the heading of these causes. And in each one of these cases you could attribute an essence to it. But Nagarjuna's saying, no, this is all just explanatory usefulness. That's all it is. And this is just simply the, this just simply refers to, this way of looking at it, without attributing any substance to it,

[15:52]

just as condition, this way of looking at it, is simply to say that it's not to say that the universe is coherent. It's not saying the universe is coherent. It's not saying the universe is ordered or reasonable. It's just to say that the coherent part of it that we can tell stories about, that's dependent colorizing. That's not true, though. It's really empty. Because the universe isn't coherent and that's part of the reason why we tell these stories, is to help ourselves out. But the story we tell, if we tell the story and we know that the story is empty, then it's dependent colorizing. If we tell the story and think this really is what's happening, then it's causation in the sense that Nagarjuna rejects. Okay? No questions? I'm not clear

[16:55]

that you really covered all of these. And also, I'm confused because Nagarjuna is saying there are four and only four relational conditions. And you're saying that these are classes of conditions. There are four classes. And in this analogy of an acorn, you're saying that the acorn, earth, air, more or less, all of those things come under the primary causative. So everything that grows an acorn, pretty much, is in only one condition, except for the dominant extending and the sequential. The appropriate or objectively extending you didn't cover. And what was that? Anyway, these are classes. These are four classes. So you don't have to have... You have to have all four classes to have...

[17:58]

You have to have all four classes. I'll give you an example, okay? One of the most wonderful examples, in some ways, is a rainbow. Actually, everything's like that, but to be clear, a rainbow... There's no such thing as a rainbow unless somebody sees it. Okay? Does everybody follow that? There's no rainbows that you don't see because, you know, you're looking this way and you don't see a rainbow, right? So there's not a rainbow. You look at a rainbow sideways, you don't see it. Sideways means perpendicular to somebody else looking at it from the other way. When you come around and see it, suddenly the fact that you see it makes the rainbow. That's alambana pratyaya. Without alambana pratyaya, without the condition of it being an object, there's no such thing as a rainbow. And it's the same for oak trees and pain and everything else. Without them being objects, they're not events for us human beings. Alambana pratyaya. Which one are you going to use? What?

[18:59]

Oh. Without using Sanskrit? Yeah. What do you mean? It's the appropriating. Object, object, percept. What's it called? Objectively extending. Objectively extending. Yeah. Objectively extending. That's it. That's one of them. Okay. When and appropriating is when you bring something in to yourself and objectively extending is when instead of it coming to you, it affecting you, you're allowing it to affect you, you attach to it. That's the objective. How does that work? In other words, unless you see it, you think it's the objective. Unless the rainbow is an object for you, it isn't an event for you. You extend yourself into an object. You see an object. You grasp an object. Therefore, you can have an experience, conscious awareness of this thing called rainbow,

[19:59]

which isn't there if you move a few feet over that way because you can't apprehend this object anymore. So what happens to the rainbow? Well, it's not an event anymore. Now, if you think about a rainbow and the thought of a rainbow is an object in your mind, then you can have a thought of a rainbow. There's a lump on the front yard there, too. Even in your dreams, a lump on the front yard is there if you're aware of something. I mean, don't say a lump on the front yard. Yeah. So both of them are happening at the same time, then. Which one? The appropriating and the objectively apprehending. No. That's two different names for the same thing. He just can't decide how to translate it. Another translation. One is coming in and one is lumping up. It's a lumping up. A lumping up means grabbing the object. That's what it means. The condition is grabbing the object. Another translation. You have to grasp the object in order to have an experience. Feelings, emotions, judgments, colors, whatever.

[21:00]

Taste. All that there is, for the experience, there has to be this. There has to be that condition. Otherwise, it doesn't happen. Another thing that has to happen is that everything has to allow it. Even the things you don't notice, everything has to allow it. That has to always happen. That's another condition. Another condition is this one of what happened before has to cease. That's another one that always has to be there. Those three have to always be there. Now, under the hetu pratyaya, or the condition of causes, there you find maybe the more unique, special cases for this particular one. Things that are similar to it have to be there. Otherwise, they can't be recognized. And also, the way we understand stories is that something similar leads to something similar. That's part of this. That isn't always there, but that's part of it. Another thing is causes, causes which are co-existent. That's the bodhichitta. So, there's these different causes that come under that. However, you've got it. So, like for turning the lights on,

[22:03]

there's the seeing the light, the alambana pratyaya, all the things that allow it, and then there's like paying the electric bill, things like that. Those things are, there's kind of a hetu pratyaya, or a causal thing, and then, what's the other one? The fact that darkness stops lets there be light. And then there's the working of electricity, there's the function of physics, there's the potential for illumination, there's electromagnetic radiation, all that stuff, is also what causes the body to athenate. Similar stuff is around, so it can happen. There have other lights that happened before, and so something similar happens. All that's necessary for us to make this story, for us to have a story of how this,

[23:06]

a sense of how this thing happens. There's other possible stories, that's why this is empty, this whole thing. Thank you. Any more? Some questions? Anyone? Yes? I'm wondering if there's other kinds of sequential, I mean, we've talked about light having to replace dark, and darkness has to be done with light. Yes. Are there other schemes of, schemes that are available, or is it always just one after the other? It seems like to me, it's always one after the other, is that when it happens? Yeah, like all at the same time. There's that one too, that's called Svabhagahetu. Huh? No, it's called Svabhagahetu. Svabhagahetu is one of these, kinds of causes that go into the first category. So that would be under sequential as well? Like for example, that's not under sequential, no. So in a moment of consciousness,

[24:08]

various mental factors co-exist. So in order to account for the experience you're having, you can't account for it, like the experience of anger. There's also concentration there, there's also consciousness there, there's also directing the mind towards the object that you're angry about, there's confusion also, and so on and so forth. There's various elements that you have to have co-existing with that, in order to account for the unique quality of that conscious experience. So when you see a rainbow, there's also, there's some different scenes of the rainbow, you have different feelings, so there's co-existing conditions under the first category of conditions that give rise to the different ways you feel when you see a rainbow, there's different moments. And then also for those, to change, for one set of co-existing causes to change the next, you have to have the samantra. Samantra is like, yeah, yeah, these have to go away for this one to come up. What's a samantra? Samantra means no gap condition, no gap between,

[25:11]

immediate between, the immediately preceding antecedent cause. That always happens in the stories which we usually tell about causation, there's a sequential aspect to them, that's the way, that's the narrative, the narrative version. This is like, the pinnacle arising is a narrative of the universe. But that's it, this is the, and it's in some sense, fictional, but in other sense it's useful, so it's a useful fiction. People today are saying it's fictional, then it's a contradiction, it's fictional, therefore I'm always in a relational condition. No, I'm just saying, that when you tell stories, whatever stories you, whatever stories you tell me, I can account for your story with these four conditions. All the elements of your story, when I hear it, I can say, that condition, that condition,

[26:11]

so all the ways that human beings make up stories will fall into these categories. The conditions aren't the stories themselves? No. No, this is a story too, this is another story which Nargajuna is telling about the categories, the elements that you use to make stories. Particularly stories about causation, narrative stories. I think he means, I think he means that, like we also have five skandhas, right? What they're saying is, you tell me what's happening, and whatever it is, I can quit one of those five skandhas. It's utilitarian. The whole point of this is, just to help us see how we tell stories. And then, in addition to that, he's saying that these categories, of elements that we use to make stories, that the categories are empty, plus all the things in the categories are empty.

[27:13]

There's no inherent nature to those things. But the categories are not false, because they aren't supposed to be true, they're just, they're also explanatory. This whole thing, is just to explain away substance. Charlie, did you see it? How does the free will... It's another story. But isn't it, isn't it like, there's no choice, because everything is, is, has, is, is determined by everything else. Everything's going along as it's told. That's, that's another story you just told there. Uh-oh. And that, that dependently co-arises, this causes me to, to rise to that. Right. But, but the story you told in the story, in my response to it, is not inherently real. So the situation isn't fixed. So,

[28:20]

there's, there's not, you know, free will doesn't have an essence either. But if you say, well, I don't see free will, that doesn't have an essence either. Well, I guess I'm wondering where, where something comes from. Uh, it's like, uh, I'm not sure how to explain it. You want to know where something comes from. Well, then we go back to the basic thing. He wants to know where something comes from, as though there's some place, actually, where something comes from. And we don't say that they don't come, that there is no place they come from. We say they, we say they, we say, where do things come from? They come from, when this comes, then that comes, that's where they come from. That's all we can say. But when this is happening, that happens. Now do you say that they come from that thing? Now, you say, no, they don't come from that thing, because then you say, that thing has the stuff that makes it come. So, but we also don't say they don't come from nowhere, because,

[29:21]

as you'll see, the next paragraph is speaking points. In a way, choosing is kind of an illusion, we're not really... Choosing is another story. Choosing is an illusion. There can be an experience, you can have an experience of choosing, and actually, whether you're conscious of it or not, every moment of experience, you have this element of choosing it. Maybe, but that also, there's a story, for every, whether you're conscious of it or not, there's a story about how all those choosings happen. There's a lawfulness, or a regularity, about how choosing occurs. You can tell stories about that. When you can see the choosing, when you're aware of the choosing, when choosing comes out of your consciousness, out of your mind, and becomes an object, then, you can have an experience of the choosing. Choosing is going on all the time, in our mind. We're always choosing. Our mind, we can't have an experience without choosing. That's going on. But sometimes, the choosing can also itself be an experience, we can experience the choosing,

[30:22]

but then the choosing has to have a lamina prajna, and we have to be able to grasp the choosing. And we do sometimes, and sometimes our ag people are in the process of, how do I choose, how do I choose? At that time, the issue of choice is out in front of you. Other times, you're going ahead and choosing without knowing it. You're always choosing, your mind is always directing itself towards one thing or another, that's going on. But sometimes you bring the process out in front of you, and then you can experience because it's a lamina prajna. Also, another thing about it is that the thing that, whatever else you were looking at before you started considering choosing, that dropped away, allowing another condition for the choosing to be on top. And then a whole bunch of other stuff that didn't drop away because that wasn't experienced, they're also not fighting in there to happen. So they're all backing off and letting the choosing be on the front. And then, all the different elements that we can account for, like, the type of choosing you're doing is similar to some other type of choosing, therefore you're able to consider it because it's a familiar concept, and so on. And there's all the coexisting elements

[31:22]

of the choosing. This is the story, the causal story to tell about where the choosing comes from. But there's not this thing that has the power to cause the choosing, like free will or not free will. And we need to think that we actually have the power to choose. There's no we or I in this story. This story doesn't have a we or I in it. It's not one of the conditions. It causes the choice to happen. The choice happens without any reference to a we or I, or free will. Excuse me, Stuart's going to have to leave now. Yeah. So, as you were talking about this this morning, the drift that I got was this. This is not an effort to be right about a causal description. No. This isn't like a rubric for giving correct causal descriptions.

[32:24]

It's a description of the structure of our causal explanation. And when Arjuna says there are four and only four, the way I've defined this situation, I think that I've exhausted all of the logical categories when we apply logical discourse when we apply causation. I think this will account for everything. We can go over it. And the reason that he wants to account for all of the kinds of causes is because after he goes through and makes a demonstration that each type of cause is empty, he doesn't want us then to say, well, but there's something we haven't accounted for. Somewhere else in the universe there is some kind of causal power that we haven't talked about yet, and that one is useless. But also, he's just simply using the regular Buddhist scholastic system which was there before him, which he is now taking the rocks out of.

[33:27]

He didn't make this up. He's just saying, he's accepting the regular system, and he's saying, but I'm just going to, for convenience's sake, I'm going to call what they call causes before. Those are going to be the things that people say have power, and conditions are going to be the things which are just categories of explanations of worldly conventions. These are the document systems. I think it would be good to finish this chapter as well. So let me just do a couple, maybe three more karakas, and then you can ask questions again, but they'll be on the table. Number two. Number three. In these relational conditions, okay, now what's going to happen, for the next few karakas, he's going to kind of like take into account

[34:29]

some extreme views and show what would happen in that case. So some of these conditions are going to kind of like, he's not going to talk about how they work, he's going to talk about how they don't work if you take certain positions. Okay. Number three. In these, I'm going to say just conditions, in these conditions, the self-nature of the entities cannot exist. From the non-existence of self-natures, other natures also, or two, cannot exist. In these relational conditions, the self-nature... I thought it was the same, they're different, okay. Certainly, there is no self-existence,

[35:31]

by self-nature, certainly there is no self-existence of existing things and conditioning causes. Certainly there is no self-existence of existing things and conditioning causes, and so on. And if no self-existence exists, neither does other existence. Okay. So, if these, if things don't have, if the essence of things is not evident in the conditions, not if, the essence of things is not evident in the conditions. The self-existence of things,

[36:34]

the self-existence of things is not found in the conditioning causes. Or, there is no self-existence of existing things in the causes. Okay? Okay? Got that? Now, and if no self-existence exists, it doesn't exist in the other either. Or, what? Yeah, which other? Which other? Any other. Any other. What are the possibilities? There's self, there's the cause, and then there's other. Okay? That's the other. Four. The functional force does not inherit in relational conditions, nor does it not inherit in them.

[37:39]

Well, let me finish the card, okay? The relational conditions, vice versa, do not inherit in the functional force, nor do they not inherit it. Okay. So, this power, you know, this functional force, this causative power, does not have conditions. It doesn't have conditions, which is the same as to say the conditions don't have it. The functional power can't go around and adopt conditions and then use the conditions to exercise itself. But, there's no functional power without conditions. You can't have functional power. Functional power, if there was such a thing, okay, it would need conditions. Because we don't talk about, like, cause coming in from nowhere. Even the substantialists, or the people who attribute essence to cause,

[38:41]

they don't say, like, cause is operating from true nothing. That's almost like no cause. That's like, that would be like something happened, but you couldn't say what was from, you see? You've got something happening, we see that, oh, there's something, there's Bob, and there's causation, but I don't know what it is, therefore, all I know is that it's Bob. It's when I set a condition to say John's there, then, then, if I would use John as the condition for the power to cause Bob, then, the causal power is in John to cause Bob. But there's no, there's no causal power floating out without conditions, but also, there's no causal power in conditions. Now, there also are no conditions floating around that don't have causal power. Conditions don't have causal power, okay?

[39:43]

But that doesn't mean that the conditions are going around and missing causal power. It isn't like there's some conditions that have causal power and some that don't. Conditions don't have causal power. Nor do, they don't have causal, there's no conditions that are without causal power, and there are no conditions that have causal power. Causal power also, causal power depends on the co-arises too. What is causal power? What is causal power? Huh? It's, it's, it's empty. Huh? Yeah, it's more like a unicorn, right? Causal power is, we can tell a story about the arising of causal power, right? In the history of the world. And why so? How does it happen? Well, I told you many times how it happens. You see something happening, like you see Bob. Well, how did Bob happen?

[40:45]

You tell a story. Well, once there was John, then there was Bob. That's the story. Maybe you don't, maybe nobody likes that one. It's that story. Once there was, you know, once there was Mr. Hoover, you know, and he was walking down the street, and blah, blah, blah, you know. So that's the story you tell, about, you use those conditions as, sort of like to talk about how Bob happened. In fact, those conditions did, did have something to do with how Bob happened, according to some people's stories. Now somebody else says, no, it wasn't Mr. Hoover, it was the milkman. Let's talk about, let's talk about the comic. I thought what I was saying was off the topic. Is there such a thing? There is, that's a story. Now, he understands it,

[41:52]

now what he's asking is, is there any essence, in the inherent nature, that some stories are better than other stories? And according to Nagarjuna, no. Is that what I'm asking? I don't know, I'm not sure if that's what I'm asking. I'm not sure what I'm asking. I'm not sure what I'm asking. We may only tell stories, and we may only read stories, but is there any reason that we might want to, sort of like, continue to refine our interpretive technique of what stories we're likely to read and tell? Is there what? Any? Is there any, like, is it? I mean, yes. Yes. Can we refine interpretive technique about the stories that we tell? Yes, definitely. We definitely have that, very strongly in us. Like I said, now, for example, to say, there's Bob, isn't much of a story. It really isn't a story at all. It's just a statement of a fact, of an appearance, okay? Then if I say, once there was John,

[42:53]

then there was Bob, the story starts to develop. Right. I don't really like that. Okay. I discuss my feelings, and I'm liking that story. Right. Well, part of the reason why you don't like that story is because you've heard better stories. That's exactly where one of my questions comes from. Because I think I have heard better stories. So we want, so we have this thing of telling the best possible story of how things happen. So even novelists are writing the most plausible and exciting and engaging fiction about how things happen. And we do want to tell better and better stories. Okay? There is that thing in us to tell really good stories about how things happen. We definitely are into that. Okay? And that's... I think it is useful. It is definitely useful. That's the whole point of it is it is useful. You can make a living of telling stories. You can listen to stories and say that you can love... I have better questions. You can love to listen to stories. But Nargajuna is saying is that they're all stories.

[43:54]

And also, the way you tell which one story is better than another. The way some... Like a writing teacher comes and tells students how to tell better stories. He is telling them another story about how in this world tremendous change how to make better stories. And that's his story. And there is a dependent co-arising of various factors in the universe such that some people tell their stories and other people tell about how to tell stories and that modifies the stories in a way that they enjoy and is useful to them. And then those stories are popular. And there is some usefulness there. And that's it. And that's all... If you stop right there that's what Nargajuna is saying. So... So all the things you're telling stories about... Well, I'll go on it later. But, you know, I kind of... Yes? Well, I keep getting the feeling

[44:56]

that there's a sort of reason that there's this pattern that he's showing for us to tell the stories or to explain the stories is that when you know that that's the story or the pattern for telling the stories then you can get going on telling them. It's a matter of, you know, seeing all these things that are being related and therefore you're not... It's not so... You have to read it exactly so you can sort of get the pattern that you can afford. That's the first and main point of this of this discourse. Yes. But that means you just have to go back there. Yes. You can go back to that except that the punchline which I'll tell you right now and then tell you again when you get there is that the punchline of this chapter

[45:58]

is that it's the rejection of causation and therefore this is the same as the upholding of dependent co-arising. Rejection of causation is, you know, things that have caused it to follow and making things happen rather than just telling stories. So this is a story that we just tell stories and that should relieve us because all the entities that arise then are empty. All the story and the results of the story lack inherent existence too. This is a big relief. However, the principle is that the reason why something is empty the reason why the story is empty is because it's just dependent co-arises. Dependent co-arising of the story the way you compose the story shows you that the story had no essence. If you see a dependent co-arising of your story you realize it has no essence. If you think

[46:59]

it does have essence that's because you think things that have essence are in the story. If you see it's just a story really just a story you could tell many other stories and you realize there's no essence there. However, the dependent co-arising itself is empty too. So then you also your emptiness is empty. Which doesn't take you back to substantiality it's just that you don't make emptiness into a thing either. But that's empty too. And your freedom is empty. And your relief is empty. Which then allows you to go right back to the story with much more energy and commitment and enthusiasm than you could before because you all have the same problem and you get essences and you get relief and you get relief from essences and you get relief from the thing that you thought had essences. But then you're temporarily slightly not liking the story anymore because you it's not quite as interesting because you have

[48:02]

not you have stopped suspending disbelief in your story. You now disbelieve your story. You don't believe your story anymore. It releases beings from the stories which they're committed to which gives them tremendous energy and possibility but at that point they might lose interest too. But then it releases them from that so they can get back interested in helping people that don't exist because the story that creates them was empty and not first of all not the story that creates them is empty but they're created by a story and they're nothing but the story. Therefore they're empty. There are not really any people there. They're just the results they're non-existing things which are caused by non-existing things. Non-inherently existing things caused by non-inherently existing causes or conditions. So how could

[49:03]

you help these people? You can help them because this whole story is also empty. You need to embrace them but now you can embrace them without believing that what you're embracing is real. Is that what you call enlightenment? I think it's not so much that the awakening is in some sense has two phases. One is the release and the other is coming back and converting beings. So that whole process of the realizing the emptiness of the thing and then realizing the emptiness of the emptiness. Those two together are kind of the description of the process of the awakening of the process of enlightenment. So once you're enlightened Exactly. So you don't stay enlightened. That's the question in my mind. Once you're enlightened is that permanent or is it forever? Enlightenment Enlightenment what it does

[50:04]

is once it's attained it's not held and it's gone beyond. The nature of enlightenment is that it isn't held. It's empty also. And because it's empty it doesn't have to stay being the way it's manifesting in a given moment. And particularly once it's once a person once a being who was endarkened or in delusion once that once they have what he calls the samantra pratyaya or the cause of enlightenment is that the delusion is seen through. So then the person attains awakening by understanding the emptiness of the delusion. But the nature of that process is especially for a Buddha which is the bodhisattva is that you go beyond that too. And going beyond that means that what happens is other beings are transformed. So you come back into the darkness and transform the darkness. The darkness goes back up into release. And the release transcends itself

[51:04]

and goes back into darkness where that cycle happens. They seem to be stages but actually they're simultaneous because you can't have enlightenment at a different stage. That's what the Buddha calls the sahabhihetu of enlightenment is that enlightenment coexists with delusion. We say before the donkey leaves the horse arrives that enlightenment doesn't wait for delusion to go away and it happens. It happens right in the midst of delusion. Right? Right? But you know you people and I could spend the whole time on this and then we'd never learn the rest of the chapters. So let me go forward and have questions rather than questions endlessly on where the place we are right now. So there seems

[52:08]

to be some understanding of karaka four, karaka five. Only as entities are uniquely related and originate can they be described in terms of relational conditions. Four, how can a non-relational condition how can non-relational conditions be asserted for entities which have not come into being. Okay? You have to say for example you have to say that you got these you have to say these or those you have to specify something you have to uniquely specify some

[53:08]

entities and then you have to say that these that these give rise to those or given these you have those you have to tell a story. And if in fact if these give rise to those or when you have these you have those or given these you have those or given whatever one you want to say then these are conditions. And as long as those do not come from these we can call them non-conditions. So as long as you tell as long as when you don't tell the story that this comes from that then that is called a non-condition. But if you say

[54:09]

this comes from that or when this arises that arises and when that arises this arises then that's a condition. That's all the more there is to it. Again saying that the conditions are empty. So it's so you know what is it again people say well what is it about that some causes what is it about that some causes give rise to the thing and other ones don't? It's just the fact that that's the way you see it and that's the story you tell and that regularity that's all there is to it. If the regularity changes it isn't that somehow something goes over and sucks the causal power out of the thing it's just that that story has changed. That's all there is to it. A non-relational condition

[55:17]

means a non-condition. Something that has something that's not in the story. A condition is not even a condition so it's called a non-condition. But anyway it's not in the story. That's all. Yes? Are all the conditions coming together in a random way? Are they? No. I wouldn't say that it's not random I would just say that when you tell a story a story is not stories are not random usually. There's not much in the story if it's random. So dependent co-arising is a description

[56:24]

of a non-random version of what's going on. But I'm not saying that things aren't happening I'm not saying that things are not happening randomly. I don't say that. I just say that when you tell a story that's not random and you don't make it don't give essence to the story then you have just you have just told the story of dependent co-arising. So if you write if you write a story if you write a fictional story and then if you would actually have that same attitude about describing your life then that would be dependent co-arising. But you would know when you did that that it was empty that you just made it up. But not just made it up

[57:24]

just to be mean you made it up because you thought it was a good story. You thought you thought it would work or help you get through the day and you thought other people would probably understand maybe or some would and understand in the sense that they wouldn't you know they wouldn't hurt you for telling that story. I think it's a reasonably good story to tell for the day. Now some people of course tell stories and they do get hurt for them, right? And then they keep telling stories and they keep getting hurt and finally they get locked up for it. It's a terrible situation when you tell stories you know that people really get upset with. It's very sad. But in some ways you know these people are better off than people who tell stories and get by with it and think that the stories are true. Because the people who tell stories and get beat up for it it isn't that they think oh my story is not true but they consider the possibility.

[58:24]

How come they're beating me up if my story is so true? Well maybe I'm a messiah so then they start thinking that. Maybe that's it. Maybe I'm unfolding the next you know the next leaf of evolution and they just don't understand it yet. That's another possibility. But they also consider well maybe I'm wrong. The other people who aren't being tortured that way they go around thinking that they're right. So the people who are getting in trouble for the stories they tell in some ways are luckier. Because there's a possibility that there's some school that you can go to. So there if maybe and also to say that there is randomness in the universe is another story. To say that there is randomness that's another story. It's a very short story but the way I just told it but it can be told in a longer and more interesting way. That's another story.

[59:29]

It's a story basically and not everything we have in a story because some things are so some descriptions are so short that people just say that doesn't qualify as a story. Like glasses is not exactly a story but you know if you think about it you can kind of say well yeah I can think of a story like that. But it's not a good one. It's not going to like just say glasses it's not going to get you through the day for more practical purposes. So then we're starting to elaborate the story and now it's getting a little bit more useful. You've got to say a little bit more to get through the day. You know we're both on the same planet there's another story. Planet both of us you know English you know England you know Shakespeare anyway all that stuff started coming into play and we think now this now we're getting the causation wrong. Is that random

[60:34]

that that happens that way? It may be but how I come to tell the story might be random who knows? But the story I'm telling doesn't seem to be random and seems to be useful and it's speaking to it's definitely describing not necessarily the universe but a universe that has some order it's describing that universe or describing such a universe which may not exist but the story itself definitely doesn't exist inherently it's just proposing conditions. So that's why in some ways it's nice to be a novelist because you can say certain things and people say well it's just a novel so it's okay that he said that. If you say this is just a fictional story then you can tell people these things and they don't get offended. But it gives sometimes it gives you a little bit more space to give people

[61:35]

a little lecture when you're putting in the mouth of a lunatic. In terms of novels there are some guidelines that say novel reading is to be a novel. Escaping subtraction is a novel. Reading by itself is a novel. So we have this. Yeah well this is to tell you about how the fact that you are constantly writing novels but when you realize that then you're not distracted. You're facing a novel that you're writing and watching how that feels to write that novel and to watch how when you know it's a novel you feel much different than when you think it's real. But there is a tendency. But let me do number six.

[62:35]

Non the relational relational condition does not validly belong to either being or non-being. If it belongs to being what use is it? Of what use is it? And if non-being for whose use? If it belongs to being for what use? And if it belongs to non-being for whose use? Okay. So an existing thing when they say existing thing they mean who means a being a being something that actually exists something that actually exists not something that exists

[63:39]

dependently because if it exists dependently it doesn't exist by itself something that exists inherently what use does it have for a condition? Things that exist don't have conditions. Things that exist things that exist inherently don't have conditions. Things that don't exist don't have conditions either. No, no. It's saying that the things the things that don't relate to an existence they're non-conditions. It didn't say that things that don't exist don't have conditions.

[64:40]

But it said things that don't exist what conditions could they have? Do you have any conditions for things that don't exist? And things that do exist can't have conditions because if they have conditions they're dependently co-arised so they don't exist. They're dependently co-arisen they don't have independent existence. They don't have being. They just have dependent being. They just have a story. They have no additional existence other than their story. If they don't have a story what story could they have? If they don't have an existence what conditions could they have? If something already exists, what good could a condition do? If it doesn't exist, what good could a condition do? If it doesn't exist, you can't help it, and nothing you can do for it.

[65:43]

You know what I mean? But if it does, you don't need any help. So does it exist? No. Well, then conditions don't apply. If it does exist, conditions don't apply. So for existent and nonexistent, conditions don't apply. What do conditions apply for? In what case do conditions apply? They apply to dependently co-arisen things. Dependently co-arisen things aren't inherently existing things. They are dependently co-arisen things. So conditions apply to things that dependently co-arise. Conditions apply to fictions. Conditions apply to what we tell stories about. That's what they apply to. But those things are not existent, because you wouldn't have to tell a story about something existent, because no story applies. It doesn't make any sense to tell a story about something that exists,

[66:46]

and also you can't tell a story about what doesn't exist. That's number six. So this is also, again, number six rejects causation, because if you don't have something that doesn't exist, then there's nothing to talk about. If it does exist, there's nothing to talk about. But there is something to talk about if things dependently co-arise, and what you have to talk about is dependently co-arising. So you tell dependently co-arising, and then you get the thing. But before you tell the story, you don't have the thing. If you can join in that process, this is the game. And then, if you join in the process, and see how, by telling the story, you get the thing, then you also see how the storytelling is empty. And then you see that the emptiness of the thing is also empty. You have to empty the emptiness. And that's what this school is particularly venerated for,

[67:51]

is that it not only shows that things are insubstantial, but that insubstantiality is insubstantial. Ana? She said there are things that are existent, and things that are dependently co-arising. If there's things that are existent, okay, you got an existent thing? Show me an existent thing. If there's... show me... I don't answer why questions. Show me an existent thing. If you show me an existent thing, you're going to have trouble showing it to me, because an existent thing doesn't have any conditions. How are you going to show it to me? How would I know if there's not an existent thing? Because if they're not, they have no conditions, so what can I say? But that was the reason that they talk about existent things. Yeah, because people think there are existent things. Don't they? It's only a matter of argumentation against something that is...

[68:55]

trying to be a statement. That's right. But see, her question was interesting, because she said, well, then there's dependently co-arising things and existent things. No. There's only dependently co-arising things. That's all an argumentation. The only kind of things there are are dependently co-arising things. Otherwise, it's just delusion. For example, how about an existent thing? Okay, got an existent thing? Well, tell me about it. Tell me the story. But you can't tell me the story, because if you tell me the story, it's not an existent thing. An existent thing, something that's already happening doesn't need some conditions to happen. Something that is doesn't need anything. So what are you telling me the story for? So you can't show me an existent thing. Well, then, are there dependently co-arising and non-existent things? You can't talk about them either, because they have no conditions. There's no way to describe existent and non-existent things. In fact, our life, for all practical purposes, is not in the realm of existence and non-existence. Our life, as we feel it, as it seems to happen,

[69:58]

the way we see it, in any way at all, is a story. The actuality is just, you know, Robert is not just whatever. Bob is not just whatever. There's a difference between Robert and Bob. There's an orderly kind of thing by which we tell one from the other. That's our life, you know. No big deal. How can you be a story without a storyteller? Who said you don't have a storyteller? You have a dependently co-arising storyteller, too. Part of the story. Storyteller is part of the story. The storyteller is part of the story, yeah. That's called, you know, you've got to have, what do you call it, part of the storytelling. They're in the booth and tell the story. Number seven.

[71:12]

When a factor of existence does not evolve from being, non-being, nor from both being and non-being, how can there be an effectuating cause? Thus, such a cause is not permissible. Now, so, if neither existent nor non-existent nor both are produced, in this case, how would there be a productive cause? If it exists, how would it be appropriate? What is a factor of existence? Something that, what do you call it, something that exists.

[72:22]

A factor of existence is something, an existent thing, a being. A phenomenon. An existing phenomenon. An existing phenomenon or a non-existing phenomenon or an existent non-existent. Which is the same as both existing and non-existing. An existent non-existent or a non-existent existent. Okay? If none of that is produced, okay, suppose that. So this is basically saying, if you say, you know, if you eliminate all these possibilities, like you say, there's not an existent thing and neither is there existent, then this first condition doesn't make any sense.

[73:25]

Now he's going back and talking about these conditions, these four kinds of conditions. Let me do them all and then you can see what he's doing. So next is, number eight is, it is said that a true factor of experience does not have an appropriating or objectively extending relational condition. So if something exists, it doesn't have an object that it appropriates. It doesn't need it. It doesn't need that condition. And if it doesn't exist, then what sense would something that doesn't exist need an object for it to exist? Because it doesn't. So existing things don't need objects, don't need the object condition.

[74:32]

Non-existing rainbows don't need it, and existing rainbows don't need it. What's an existing rainbow? Yeah. How can you have an existing rainbow, you see? Because if you had an existing rainbow, it wouldn't need you to know about it. It would just be an existing rainbow. An existing rainbow wouldn't need you to see it, right? This is a wonderful example. Look at that one. Take an existing rainbow. If there is a rainbow, it doesn't need you to see it. Is there such a rainbow? No. Right? There's no rainbow that's existing someplace in this universe that doesn't need anybody to see it. There's no such thing, right? Got it? Except for that special one they're building in Hungary, right? Now, how about a non-existing rainbow?

[75:35]

Does that need anybody to see it? Well, even if it needs somebody, nobody can see a non-existing rainbow. So, for existing rainbows, the condition doesn't hold. There can be an object of awareness. That doesn't hold. And for non-existing ones, it doesn't hold either. So again, if things exist or don't exist, then this condition doesn't hold. And what does it hold for? It holds for things that dependently co-arise. Those, since the rainbow dependently co-arises, right? In other words, you've got to have certain colors and water and, you know, and light. And then you've got to have an observer. Thus, that rainbow dependently co-arises. There's a dependently co-arising rainbow, and that needs conditions. But real rainbows don't have any conditions. And they don't need...

[76:36]

First of all, I said they don't have any, right? Now he's telling you specifically how they don't need them. And then, then the next one, number eight. Number nine. It is not possible to have an extinction where factors of experience have not yet arisen in the extinguished state for what use is a relational condition. Thus, the sequential or contiguous relational condition is not applicable. Since things are not arisen, it is not acceptable that they cease. An existent thing doesn't arise. Therefore, it can't cease. Therefore, an immediate condition is not reasonable. If something has ceased, how could it have a condition? So that one also doesn't hold.

[77:48]

Okay. Now comes the big one. Number ten. As entities without self-nature have no real status of existence, the statement from the existence of that this become is not possible. If things did not exist without essence, the phrase, when this exists, so this will be, would not be applicable, would not be possible. The phrase, when this exists, then this will be, or from existence of that, this become, that's a definition of a condition and that's a definition of dependent co-arising. The basic phrase, from the existence of that, this becomes,

[78:59]

or depending on that, this. That's a basic reason for dependent co-arising. In other words, depending on this, you have that. Or depending on that, you have this. This depends on that. This does not inherently exist. This does not independently exist. This is not an existing thing. It is a dependently conjured up thing. That's what it is. That's dependent co-arising. Now, if things did not exist without essence, then that wouldn't apply. If things couldn't exist without essence, then it wouldn't apply, that this depends on that. If things had to have essence, then it wouldn't apply, that with this, then that. And the basic ingredient of the dependent co-arising wouldn't apply if things couldn't exist without essence. So, there it is.

[80:08]

That's big, big, big one. So far, this is all Nagarjuna talking, so far. He's just talking straight. And then after this now, he's made all these points, and this final point, which is the main one, now he can imagine criticism of that position. So again, if things can't exist without essence, then dependent co-arising wouldn't hold. If things can't appear without essence, then dependent co-arising couldn't hold. Put it the other way, if things have essence, then dependent co-arising doesn't hold. Couldn't exist without equals have. Is that not true? Well, I wouldn't say it's not true, I'm just saying, I mean, Nagarjuna's saying, that Buddha's teaching of dependent co-arising wouldn't hold if things had essence. No, it says, if things could not exist without essence,

[81:14]

things... What? This translation looks like what? As entities without essence have no real status. No real status means do not exist. As things without self-nature, without essence, have no... do not exist. OK? Now, this says... Do you see that? As entities without self-nature have no real status means that entities without self-nature do not exist. There are no entities existing that don't have self-nature. All the things that exist have self-nature. It's the same as saying, as entities without self-nature have no real status of existence. Is that everybody down on the board here? What? Essence. Essence. That's right. So, this statement is saying,

[82:19]

if you don't have self-existence, if you don't have self-existence, if you don't have essence, then you have no status of existence. You don't exist if you don't have essence. If you don't have essence, you don't exist. OK? If that's true, then the teaching from this Lord, from the existence of God, that wouldn't apply. In other words, if it's the case that only beings that have essence exist, then Buddhist teaching of dependent co-arising wouldn't apply. Say that again. One more time. If it's the case that only beings that have essence really exist, if all the things that really are there have essence, if that's the case, then Buddhist teaching of dependent co-arising doesn't apply. It's not clear to me what that means. As entities without self-nature have no real status of existence, as things with essence, as things that don't have essence have no real status of existence,

[83:23]

the statement... Now, this doesn't look to me like dependent co-arising. This looks to me like some sort of implication of probable power. From the existence of that, this becomes not possible. It sounds to me like what he's saying is that as things without essence don't have any real status of existence, you can't say that things originate out of other things. It's a denial of causation. It's not a denial of dependent co-arising. Well, that's what I'm telling you. That's why it's important. Because that quote, now you're quoting Buddha. I see. Okay. That's Buddha. That's his key kind of like module term, dependent co-arising. I get it. Wouldn't it be fair to say that the first part of saying if it were true that things are... if it's the nihilist standpoint that things were truly non-existent, utterly non-existent, then you could say that... I mean, would you put this back in front? It's not clear in the translation either.

[84:23]

It sounds like that's what you're saying. No, I'm not saying that. But you can flip this over and make it into the nihilist position if you want to. This is not saying the nihilist position, but it's taking just the other extreme. It's saying... Actually, this is the nihilist position, I think. You're saying that if things don't have essence, they have no real status. So, if you say that... One interpretation was things don't have essence, therefore, nothing has real status. There's nothing that has real status. Whereas dependent co-arising is the way it says this isn't real, it's a nihilist guess. No, it's not saying that. It's not saying this isn't real at all. Well... This is... No, it's not saying that. It doesn't use the word real. It just says this is what's happening and that's it. That things are dependently co-arising. All it says is... If you've got this, you've got this. It doesn't say this has the power to cause that. It doesn't say that.

[85:24]

It says... As a matter of fact... Because, if you say this has the power to cause that, then this has some essence. Okay? And then if this has essence, then maybe this has essence. Okay? So then you've got these essence things. And if they've got essence, then they don't need... Then this wouldn't need this to cause it. And if this had essence, it wouldn't be going around causing things. Because it wouldn't need to. Things that exist don't, like, do stuff. They just exist. They don't have any job. And they don't require any support. Existent things don't go around causing stuff. And existent things aren't caused. It's not because they aren't caused by a person. They just don't need it. As a matter of fact, if they did need it, they wouldn't be existent things. So, if they don't need it,

[86:26]

then why would they have it? Well, they don't. Okay? So then we don't... If that's the case, if we have existent things, we don't need dependent co-arising. So dependent co-arising doesn't seem necessary and doesn't apply. It's inapplicable and not appropriate. That's the big paradox of this. And now I get an attack. But in the attack, it gets clearer, what's going on here. What time is it? 10 to... No, 10 to 20. Almost 10 to 20. Okay. So, I think we have a chance, maybe tomorrow night, we can sort of cover this chapter. And then, once we cover it, then you can ask... I'd like to get through it, so you've got a little bit on all of them, so you understand a little bit on all of them, and then you can ask questions. But I think we have three paragraphs of what is objectively grave, and then we close with a case study. And then with this chapter,

[87:28]

under yourself, then you have, then you have, I think you can go on to 24, with a revised understanding of the universe.

[87:42]

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