So I just wrote on this left side, Mind, Thought and Consciousness, or Chitta, Alaya, Manas and Mana-Vijnana. And then this is Chapter 5, and then Chapter 6 introduces imputational character, other dependent character, and a thoroughly established character, and then Chapter 7 introduces a lack of own being in terms of character, lack of own being in terms of production, or production, production, lack of own being, and ultimate lack of own being. The imputational character is something defined as that which is imputed to phenomena, either

[02:16]

as names and concepts, names and symbols, in terms of essences, or in terms of own being, or you could almost say it the other way too, that which is imputed to phenomena as essences as in terms of names and symbols, but I think it says as names and symbols in terms of essences, essences and attributes. And the other dependent character is the dependent co-arising of phenomena. The other dependent character of phenomena is simply dependent origination of phenomena,

[03:35]

is like this, because this exists, that arises, because this is produced, that is produced. It ranges from, due to conditions of ignorance, compositional factors arise, up to, in this way, the whole great assemblage of suffering arises. So, this is dependent co-origination. And one thing I just thought I'd mention here to you is that Asanga, in his Mahasamgraha says, the dependent co-arising, as it appears in the Alaya Vijnana, is the most subtle and most profound interpretation

[04:46]

of dependent co-arising in the great vehicle. The dependent co-arising, as it appears in the Alaya Vijnana, is the most subtle and profound interpretation of dependent co-arising in the great vehicle. So, it's almost like some people might say, well, that would be like you could equate Alaya Vijnana with the other dependent character, because the other dependent character is the dependent co-arising of phenomena. I'm not ready to do that quite.

[05:47]

And what, actually... Asanga is not quite saying that dependent co-arising is of the Alaya Vijnana, but dependent co-arising, as it appears, in the Alaya Vijnana, is the most subtle understanding of dependent co-arising. And then he goes on to say some more, but I'll just say what he says initially, and maybe go into considerable further discussion of this. But he says there's two kinds of dependent co-arising, or two levels. One is that dependent co-arising which distinguishes essences. That's one kind.

[06:51]

The other kind of dependent co-arising is that dependent co-arising which distinguishes the pleasurable and displeasurable. And he says the first type, the type which distinguishes essences, means the arising of all things is supported by Alaya Vijnana. I'm sorry, did you say, is supported by Alaya Vijnana? I said, is. The arising of all things is supported by Alaya Vijnana, or supported...

[07:54]

Mr. Keene's translation is supported upon Alaya Vijnana, comma, for it distinguishes the essences of the causes of all varied things. And then he says the second type of dependent co-arising, which I mentioned, is that which distinguishes between pleasurable and unpleasurable. The second kind is the twelve-fold dependent co-arising. For it distinguishes the various different causes for the pleasant and unpleasant in wholesome and unwholesome destinies.

[09:05]

What does a predicate do in relationship... how does a predicate function in relationship to a subject? It's the action of the subject. So, the scholar Geoffrey Hopkins speaks of these three characteristics as being the subject, as being subjects, and the three types of lack of one being as being the predicates. So, the ultimate activity in a sense, according to that, of the imputational character, is the activity of being a lack of one being in terms of character. And the activity of the other dependent character, which is dependent co-arising,

[10:21]

its activity is that it's a production lack of one being. Or you could say it's a production in which there's no one being. In thoroughly established characters, its activity is being the ultimate lack of one being. So, this is one kind of... and so it's a relationship between these mechanics of mind, between these transformations of mind, these three transformations of mind as a relationship, and the three characters of phenomena. And the three types of lack of one being. Three types of lack of one being are a subtle discrimination about different dimensions of emptiness,

[11:27]

different ways to help us understand emptiness. So, I wouldn't say that the imputational character is Manas, but rather that Manas is the way, is the active imagining of a self. So, but Alaya is... but Manas depends on Alaya, so Alaya supplies the image of something existing in an impossible way. And so, each morning we are born with a mind that's predisposed towards conventional designations,

[12:31]

and with a mind that's predisposed to imagining things existing in an impossible way, because we have imagined things existing in an impossible way in the past. The impossible way we imagine things to exist is that they exist all by themselves, independent of the rest of the universe. But this image of something existing on its own, according to the sutra, is necessary in order to make conventional designations. It's necessary, I can even say, again, relating to the phenomena of society, in order to have a society that uses conventional language, we need an image of something that exists by itself, otherwise we can't make conventional designations. So, for this phenomena of society to dependently co-arise,

[13:39]

it needs images, or it needs an image of things being not dependently co-arising. And that's what Manas can actively imagine, and alaya-vijnana offers that image moment by moment. Image is just a fantasy of something that doesn't exist at all. So the imputational character is that which is imputed to phenomena, and that which is imputed is something about them that's not true at all, that doesn't have... completely unreal, completely imaginary, just imaginary, just an idea, not the least bit more. However, this idea is based on something, and although it's an impossible idea, it's still an idea.

[14:47]

But if you believe it is so, then it's a mistake. It's a mistaken idea if you think it's true, and what it's based on, its basis, is the other dependent character. So, if it's an alaya, you could say, Oh yeah, it's based on alaya, because it's based on the idea. The idea that things exist on their own is based on that idea, which is stored in alaya. But also, it's based on the phenomena, which is the other dependent phenomena, and understanding the dependent co-arising in terms of alaya, according to Asanga anyway, is a very subtle way to understand the dependent co-arising,

[15:49]

very subtle indeed. And then Asanga goes on to say that those who are confused about the dependent co-arising by alaya-vijnana or of alaya-vijnana, imagine, those who are confused, imagine, in original essence, our own being as the cause of transformation. Excuse me, as the cause of transmigration. And there's other possibilities. Or they think that past actions create the present. Or they think, or they cling to the creative action of a god.

[16:55]

Or they propose a self. Or they claim that there is no cause. People who are confused about the dependent co-arising of alaya, imagine these possibilities. And people who are confused about the second kind of dependent co-arising, namely the fourfold chain of causation, imagine self as the subject of the action and experience. The last one? Those who are confused about the dependent co-arising in the twelvefold form, imagine that self is the subject of the action and experience.

[18:00]

And then he gives a famous example. If you bring an elephant to a group of blind people and have them feel the elephant, they come up with various strange interpretations of what it might be. Like they think it's a rope, or a mountain, or a fan, you know, or something. People do not understand the two kinds of dependent co-arising simply because they are blinded by primordial ignorance. Whatever they claim, as above, is because they do not understand the basic pattern of alaya-jnana and its cause-result relationships. They are like those blind people.

[19:11]

They don't recognize the shape of the elephant and make very strange explanations. So, again, alaya is this... I mean, the imputational character is this imputation of self and it's based on... The imputation is totally fantasized, but it's still based on the other dependent character because the other dependent character is what it's projected on. It's projected on other dependent phenomena. But another way of understanding this is that the imputational character of the other dependent character and thoroughly established character are ideas. One way is to understand these characters as phenomena, but another way to understand them is their ideas about the world. So, the other dependent character is not conventional truth,

[20:16]

it's not truth at all, it's totally fantasy. The imputational character is not truth at all, it's just fantasy. The other dependent character is conventional truth. And the thoroughly established character is ultimate truth. The imputational character can be projected on the other dependent character and the thoroughly established character. The imputational character can be imputed to conventional truth and ultimate truth. However, when it's projected on... wherever it's projected, it's based on the other dependent character. It doesn't say it's based on the thoroughly established character

[21:20]

even though it can be imputed to the thoroughly established character. It also says in chapter 6, a very... to me, quite surprising thing to hear the sutra say, it says that the way you know the imputational character is through... is it named in association with signs? When you're using names in association with signs, that's how you know the imputational character? And how do you know the other dependent character? By strongly... Pardon? By strongly adhering to the other dependent as being imputational. Yeah, by strongly adhering to the other dependent as being imputational. That's how you know the other dependent character. That's what the sutra says.

[22:27]

And then how do you know the thoroughly established character? Absence of the imputational and the other dependent character. Close. Absence of strongly adhering. The absence of the imputational and the other dependent is the thoroughly established character. It says how do you know the thoroughly established character? And it's by, in the absence of strongly adhering to the imputational character as being the other dependent or vice versa. Primordial ignorance is to strongly adhere to the imputational character as the other dependent character. Because of that, we can't see and understand the other dependent character. Because we strongly adhere to the imputational as being the other dependent.

[23:31]

I see your question. I don't think people are quite ready with the questions. Thank you. Thank you.

[24:47]

I wonder if you can if you can see named in association with science. Because that's how you know the imputational character. Thank you. Any questions? Maybe I'll stop right there and you can start asking questions about that point. Named in association with science. Yes? Only about names in association with science? Yeah, this time. Pardon?

[25:49]

Well, yes. What you're saying is true. That's what we always do. And it would be great not to believe it. But first of all, I'm asking if you can notice if you know the imputational character. Can you see the can you see the names that are connected to science? Can you see that? Because although it would be nice not to believe the imputational character as being the other dependent character, that would be very wonderful. I don't know if we have much of a chance not believing it until you can see what it is. And actually this chapter 6 says that learning

[26:56]

knowing the imputational characters really is is part of the process of abandoning afflicted character. Afflicted character are what you understand when you understand the other dependent character as it is. But that's based on understanding the imputational character and understanding character as phenomena. So I wonder if you have some sense of names connected to science. Yes? That sense only arises if entering the space of not knowing. Can you say that again? That sense of not adhering to That was not my question. to names and so forth. That's not my question. I'm asking do you know about do you see the connection between

[27:57]

names and science? Because that's how you will know. Yes? I can feel a definite sensation in my body right now which I there's I think three things going on there. One is I sort of kind of name it with nervousness and there's sort of a gain and loss sort of thing going on there. And then also there's the actual sensations that form that sometimes hinder me even seeing anything. So these formations or sensations are sort of like the symbolic part that sort of keeps me sometimes from expressing myself. What's the is the name you're speaking is the example you're using the name is nervousness? Nervousness, yes. And what's the sign? The sign is the

[29:01]

it's not the sensations themselves, but it's more the the hindrance that the sensations gives rise to. So what is what is the sign look like? Can you draw a picture of the sign? Can you draw a picture of the sign? No, I can't. Like the taste of an apple. Right, but there's a sign there. Maybe you can't see it, but there's a sign there. Yes. If you have something to add, please say something about how you see the name connected to signs. When I say to somebody we're meeting in the Wheelwright Center and the person knows what the Wheelwright Center implies means that they have experienced it, they have an image of it. Now what about you? When you say it? When I say it, I have an image of it. I have an image in my head.

[30:03]

I have a visual image. Which is the sign of the Wheelwright Center? Yes, I think that's the sign. What is the sign? The sign is a building. The building is already a sign again. It's a building. It's a visual image. And it also is in a certain location, so that's also visual. And what is the visual image you have usually when you say Wheelwright Center? It's made up from shapes. Colors. But how far do you go when you say Wheelwright Center? I don't go into detail because I have this whole... Well, how far do you go? I'm saying how far do you go? Like, do you just see, like, the corner of the door over there? Or do you see, like, the ceiling? Or do you see the roof line? What is the image that's in your mind when you say Wheelwright Center? That's what I'm asking you to look at. You could have... There's infinite images you could have of this building that you would use as a sign for the name, the word...

[31:04]

the word Wheelwright Center, right? So I'm asking you to look to what sign is there when you say Wheelwright Center. I think I'm looking at something that I make up as the essence of the Wheelwright Center. That's not the sign. That's not the sign. The imputational character will be known by, first of all, the sign in association with the name. Then the imputational character will be the imputation of sign, will be the imputation of an essence, which will be in terms of the names and dependent on signs. Is that clear? Yeah. It says you know it. It doesn't say you know it by essences, because the imputational character is that which is imputed as an essence. In terms of... or as names and symbols. So it doesn't...

[32:08]

When it says you will know it by names in connection with signs, I'm asking you, do you see the signs? And if I think of the Wheelwright Center, I can think of the Wheelwright Center, and I have thought of the Wheelwright Center. I never have I thought of the Wheelwright Center with exactly the same signs as the past times. It's always a slightly different sign. Slightly different image. I don't have a... It's a complex enough image so that I can see that I don't have the same image of the Wheelwright Center over and over. I have so many images of the Wheelwright Center. But each time that the imputational character operates with me to see if I can make the conditional designation Wheelwright Center, I do have a sign there. I'm asking you, can you spot the signs you're using in connection with words to see the imputational character? So, with Astrid's example, as you were talking to her, I thought, what is the sign that I use? And it's a complex set of signs

[33:09]

that have to do with conjunction of the white wall and the blue rug and rectilinear shapes, you know, kind of sharply defined rectangles and the light coming through the window of some conjunction of those that make a complex sign and for me represent the Wheelwright Center. Okay. Is it always like that? No, sometimes it's the fireplace. Right. Yes. Some... Some things I'm thinking about, like the Wheelwright Center, the... the actual sign is not describable. It just comes like... No, wait a second. It is not describable. Stop talking. I'm asking about people who can describe the signs because signs can be described. And how do you describe them?

[34:09]

By using the imputational character which is connected to signs and names with the imputation. You have to impute an essence to anything in order to describe it. So if you're going to tell me about the signs connected to the names, you're going to have to impute essences to the signs and the names to tell me about what they are. But I think you're also going to have to do that to find them in the first place so that you can know the imputational character. I think you have to go through that process. So if you say it's not describable, then we're not going to be able to talk. But I want to talk. I want to find out if you understand how to do this. Yes? I'm not sure if I understood, but it sounded like we were saying, and I'm questioning this if this is what was being said, that to use a sign of a place that we're going to, that the sign would necessarily be in a visual image.

[35:11]

A sign is an image, yes. But not necessarily a visual image. No, it can be a case image. How about a conceptual image that's like a destination, a sense of location? A conceptual image? Images are conceptual. Okay. But there's this sense about something. When I say location or destination, it's like a place in relation to other places. They're like pathways that you get to get, go to get there. You're telling me about a concept now. That's why I'm trying to understand. So in order to reach what you would consider to be the sign or any particular sign that could be imputed as the Wheelwright Center. A sign which could be imputed as the Wheelwright Center. Named as the Wheelwright Center. That would have to come, that every time we use the word

[36:14]

Wheelwright Center, we are actually activating a visual or other sense. Every time we, if I just say Wheelwright Center, that doesn't require this. But if you say we're going to the Wheelwright Center. No. I can say we're going to, like right now I can say we're going to the Wheelwright Center and not have any sign of Wheelwright Center. Okay. Except the verbal itself. But to make conventional designations, I need to use the imputational character. The imputational character is not just saying, making an utterance. It's actually imputing something to something. It's actually talking about something. It's not just, it's not just that I imagine an essence. It's when I put the essence on something. It's when I impute it to something. So then it's going to be connected to names and signs.

[37:16]

Because I'm not going to, imputational character isn't just to imagine self and put it up all over the place. Because every time I put it in a place, I have to say that's that place. That place has to have a sign. And then to complete the conventional designation, I have to pull the word in. But before I can pull the word into the thing, I have to have sign and the essence. So it isn't just, I can say Wheelwright Center, but without designating anything. And then the imputational character isn't necessary. That wasn't so much what I meant. Suppose we had an exchange like the one that Oscar gave as an example. Very specific and real. I will meet you at the Wheelwright Center at 2 o'clock. Yes, we will meet at the Wheelwright Center at 2 o'clock. Now, you can make that agreement and have a lot of imputation about where the Wheelwright Center is and what time it will be and who will be there. Right, but just simply, that's the Wheelwright Center. There's imputation. Right.

[38:20]

I don't have to make it more complicated. Right, but there's imputation. But can you, I guess I'm struggling with the sense that we say these things in communication with other people in order to move through the world and do what we do and that in making some of these statements with one another and utterances with one another we're not necessarily operating on a level of having a visual image or a sound image other than the word. We understand the word. We communicate on the level of words, words, words without accessing some series of images of the place. That's what I'm asking. You're wondering. So I'm saying, I guess I'm saying according to this sutra that when I say that's the Wheelwright Center then I have an image in my mind that I'm looking at which, a sign of the Wheelwright Center and then I put the word

[39:21]

Wheelwright Center with that sign. Right. Now if I say I'll meet you at the Wheelwright Center and I can't see the Wheelwright Center I have a thing in my mind and if you go to a different building that's not what I had it. That's the sign I had in my mind not connected to the other building. Right. But that sign in your mind is what I was getting at as possibly being somewhat abstract rather than this corner, that corner this floor, the fireplace the stairway. Those are what you just said were abstractions. All those things were abstractions. This corner, that corner are abstractions from the building. In certain kinds, you know. Yeah, you're taking part of it. Right. That's what we were hearing as examples. You gave I think Anbo gave those kind of examples as a sign that you would have of the building. Right. I was asking isn't there a way that we have a sense a signed sense of the building that's not specifically

[40:22]

one, there's not. I see Linda shaking her head no. She must understand the question. Not the building itself. It's a symbol of it. She wants it without a visual image. She wants to be able to have it without having a visual image. But it should also be the sound of a door? I think if you have an accumulated sense of things and then you have this word and this imputation of a place that's so specific Are you asking if the image has to be visual? That's what I started with. But then you said yes it could be auditory or old fashioned. So what's your question? I don't get it. The images you have of the Wheelwright Center are not the Wheelwright Center. They never are. Of course not. They're all abstract conceptual renderings of the Wheelwright Center. So what's your question? Maybe somebody else understands my question. Thanks Anbo. I think

[41:25]

what Catherine is asking is whether I mean this loads the question but it sounds to me like she's asking whether you can have words without references. Whether you can just have a word capacity and you can name names and use words and not have references for them. Is that what you're asking? Well that's kind of an extreme form of what I'm asking. Like a general word like building? No I'm actually thinking of a very specific situation. The one that Astrid gave. This is a place that we come to we agree to meet here but I just wonder if we use these words without having like if I have we all have many different experiences of this room and when we use the word are we thinking is it based on a particular experience or based on some accumulated sense of all our experiences that we couldn't put down into a single image

[42:27]

as the basis for the as the concept that is the basis for the sign. I couldn't follow that. I'm sorry. But anyway the word building itself is a potential conventional designation but I can say building without making conventional designation. I didn't say something was it I didn't designate it I just said building. That's a word. In order for me to make a designation I need the imputational character and I've got the imputational character and what that is is something that operates in connection with words signs and then the essence and I want to find this imputational character I want to know it about it. So I'm asking you first of all can you find how it is that names are used with signs? And so

[43:28]

are you having trouble answering my question? Is that right? I'm having trouble thinking that we in using words in using language in making sentences and utterances that we think of as meaningful therefore they are imputational and we are going through all these operations of imputing essences to things. I'm having trouble thinking that when we're doing that we are the sign that is the basis for our use of words is a single sense image or conceptual remembrance of a single sense image. Single sense image or memory of a single sense it doesn't have to be a memory of a single sense image. I think what's being said here is that it's going to be an image that arises from the laya and the image can be extremely complex or extremely simple.

[44:31]

As we go along I think this is saying as the imputational character operates every time it takes a word it checks to see what's it checks physically with the laya what is this word right? Is this the word that goes with this sign? Now this word can go with a lot of signs Wheelwright Center can go with a lot of signs. It can go with the smell. Somebody maybe says Wheelwright Center that's Wheelwright Center it's physical. They've got a concept they've got a concept that that's that sign that physical experience that's the sign that Wheelwright Center goes with. Somebody else may say I never smelled that before. But anyway that person uses that for that word and we do that step by step. We sometimes trip but we basically keep checking that's that's how you find the imputational character. That's where you're going to look for the imputation of essence it's going to go with that. And we need to do

[45:33]

all three of those things in order to make conventional designations like that's the Wheelwright Center. So I'm asking you to look for that because that's that you can see. You can see this. And that's it's in terms of that that you know dependent co-arising which you would be able to see if you weren't what do you call it if we didn't have this strong predisposition to make conventional designations we this this ignorance of believing the essence which we are imputing all the time could give us a chance to see. Yes? When you're using the term imputational character do you mean you don't mean when you're just making utterances? No, I mean I can hear if I'm speaking nonsense words or meaning I don't I don't mean when I'm going blablabla that's not

[46:33]

a conventional designation. Now sometimes when we're talking but that was a conventional designation sometimes when we're talking is it possible that we would be talking without actually imputing anything? Not if you're making conventional designations but you could talk without making conventional designations. Can you give me an example? Blablabla Can you give me an example with words that can you give me an example with words that also could be used as imputational character but you'll use them without imputing something? Uh that wasn't an example. But maybe you're saying he wasn't doing that. Yeah words came out like that. Yeah. Was that a sign? I'm just looking at myself to see if I can utter something utter a word like can I say dog without my mind then jumping for the sign and

[47:33]

catching an essence of being of dog there. Can I say a word like that without my mind, doing that without... I mean, Arazi may or may not be in the room, but can I say that? And I don't know if I can. Else. Else? I'm not saying you can't do it, but I don't know if I can do it. Would you say that is? Else? She has to say it. If I say it, if you ask me for example and I say else, I think what's the sign of else? I think the alternative, and I see the essence. So it's not so much that we... not so much at this point looking for you to be able to avoid making conventional designations and avoid using the imputational character. What I'm trying to have you do is get to know the imputational character first. Then it's more like what we're... we don't really try to bust the imputational character, but try to

[48:36]

find the absence of it. Suchness is not busting of the imputational character. It's looking at something that's happening for you, a conventional truth, and seeing the absence of this imputational character, which you know quite well. In that absence, there won't be any imputational character, but there also will be no conventional designation. So if you could then start using the words which are used in conventional designation after you no longer believe the imputational character, you might be able then to use words in that way. It's possible. But the main thing I'd like you to do is learn how to actually see how this process of delusion works. Yes? Okay, I have an example. Yeah? The other day, I went into the kitchen to wring out one of the rags after our oriyaki,

[49:40]

and it was the first time I had been in the kitchen to do something like that since I I cook a lot at home, and as soon as I wrung it out, it felt like kitchen, like that whole collection of experiences that I know as being working in the kitchen that I hadn't done for two weeks, and then all of a sudden, you know, it was there in the squeezing of the rag somehow. And then you could have said kitchen. Yeah, there was no word, but I felt kitchen. And I don't know, I'm not remembering now that there was an actual image of, because it wasn't Well, the image was this. This experience, that was the image. Would you say that's what you're calling a sign? That's a sign, yeah, that's a sign of, for you, it's a sign of kitchen. That goes with the word kitchen. Did you say kitchen? Did you say, did you think kitchen? Well, the initial feeling, it's interesting because it was really clear to me that before

[50:48]

I had the word kitchen, I felt, you know, this familiarity that I then called kitchen after, but there was definitely Maybe the squeezing of the rag gave rise to the sign of kitchen, which is a familiar feeling in your body. Right. So that feeling sensation might actually be That might be the sign. So the feeling sensation can't be the sign. What? That's Catherine's answer. What did you say? The feeling sensation itself can't be the sign, is the sign. The feeling sensation itself, no. The image of the feeling sensation is the sign. Which is based on that physical sensation. But, Are we still doing examples? But he didn't have words that gave us a description of the sensation. He had a personal sensation, but it wasn't conventionally designated, it wasn't for me.

[51:53]

I know he had something, but I don't know what was out inside of him. So could that feeling be the sign? He might be able to tell you. See, I don't know that there was a, I'm not sure, and maybe there was and I wasn't aware of it. There was a picture of a kitchen. That's what I'm trying to figure out, like the feeling is still with me, and I can now feel kitchen. But I'm not actually, it could be Kitchen isn't a feeling. Kitchen is a word, which can be connected to a sign. And then if we impute an essence to that, whatever that is, we can make a connection designation. Yes? So my example would be a shape, a brown shape, and fuzzy color shape, and Toba.

[53:04]

And if she turns around, and I see more shape and other various colors and so forth, then I get a stronger belief. Or it might turn out to be Simon. Right. So, yes? Hm? My first thought was that this sign, like going back to the Rewrite Center as an example, this sign, the sum of all our experience, with that It's a sign of the sum of all your experience? It's like, any of that, any of my experience, if somebody comes here, and has never been to Green Gulch, and I tell them, you meet in the Rewrite Center, and they don't know what it is, there is no experience. There's nothing there, there's no seat, there's no layout, Rewrite Center. But when I tell them, oh, it's this building, then there is an experience of it,

[54:11]

and that what they see is the sign for future, and on that builds future experiences. So the signs for me that I have in connection with the word Rewrite Center are different from yours, because my experience has been different. Right. And in your example, if you tell someone, use the word Rewrite Center, and that they don't have a sign that's connected to the word Rewrite Center, then conventional designation works in the sense that they say, I don't know what you're saying. I don't know what you're referring to. But in that case, it's the same thing, because they just don't have a sign which goes with that word. They probably have a sign of a building. Pardon? They probably have a sign of a building. Yeah, they do, right. They probably have that. But I'm just saying that... But also, Rewrite Center doesn't necessarily know it's a building. Just say, I'll meet you at the Rewrite Center, at the center of the world. But anyway, you're saying a word which they don't have a sign to go with that word,

[55:14]

so the invitational character isn't yet operating for that person on that thing. Couldn't they impute an essence to the Rewrite Center without having any direct sense experience of this Rewrite Center? Could you talk to them, give them signs to impute an essence to this? Well, if you say... I can impute essences to things that I'm not making conventional designations about. So they can't make a conventional designation about the Rewrite Center without having one of the five sense experiences of the Rewrite Center? No, I'm not saying that. You can make conventional designations without having... I can make a conventional designation about the Rewrite Center without seeing the Rewrite Center. Or having ever seen? Without having ever seen? Or heard, or smelled, or tasted, or touched? Well, even if I've never been to Green Gulch

[56:16]

and somebody tells me about the Rewrite Center, I may find out that it's a building again and then associate it with other buildings I've seen. But I'm just saying that some nonsense experience, I can interpret that as an essence. Just that, in order to make conventional designations, you need to impute essences. But it doesn't mean that you only impute essences in the process of conventional designation. Now that we know how to do it in that process, we can do it even when we're not making conventional designations. Before we know how, we can still do it. It's still that basic thing, but the thing has an essence. Even before we try to connect it to a word. So you can project essences on the signs before you have words to go with the signs. And connecting the words to signs in a conventional, social way,

[57:18]

we learn. But the projection of the essence, which will be the support for connecting the word, will be the place where we're going to connect the sign to the word, that we know how to do at birth, before we know any words. How do I project the space between you and me? How do I see space between you and me? What's the sign for that? The sign for the space? Yeah. Can you see it? Can you see the sign for it? No. No? Can you see the sign for distance? Can you see the sign for me being out there? Yeah. Yeah. You might not be able to because the distance, you know, the sign of our separation is... Our separation is non-existent,

[58:22]

so it may have trouble finding a sign for something that doesn't exist. Our separation doesn't exist. So finding a sign for it may be difficult. But if you want to talk about the separation, then you may be conventionally designating something else other than this non-existent separation. And calling it separation. Because we have some sense of it, but what is it? It's the other dependent character which we're interpreting. Falsely. As a separation. And the other dependent character gives us some basis or some appearance of separation. And once you have the appearance of separation, and you believe it, then you can create, you know,

[59:22]

indirectly then create a sense of existence and space. Space, by the way, is the imputational character. It's an existing imputational character. It dependently co-arises. Andreas? I have an example that I just want to see if I'm right about it. I see like one of the chairs in front of me and call it a chair in my mind, or see it as a chair. The sign that comes up for me is something much more which I sit on. It's different. I mean, my sign is different from this particular chair. Is that your original question? That could be a sign. The sign of a chair is something you can sit on. In other words, in a matter of fact, the most accurate images are those related to bodily function. Those are the most direct images. Or my prototypical sign is much more like this chair that I'm sitting on,

[60:25]

which is like that this is level and this is a rectangular 90 degree angle instead of these chairs. Yes. So that's the sign that I have prototypically with a chair instead of these chairs, even though I know that this is a chair. Okay. And you connect the word chair or stuhl with it. Yes? I've got a reverse problem. There's a particular image I've had for a long time that always reminds me of what it feels like to not be able to know the word. It's kind of becoming more familiar. And that struggle to come up with a word is like I'm trying to make a conventional designation or have I already made a conventional designation? I can draw it. I can actually make a drawing of this thing that I don't know the word for. But it feels frustrating because I don't know what the word is.

[61:30]

I don't know what you call that thing. Yes, so it's like you have the sign but not the word. Yes. And also you probably have a sense of projecting an essence on this. Oh, yes. I know they exist. That's what it says. So even before you find the word for the sign, just wanting to find the word for this thing is almost close enough to study Buddhism. So don't worry. Do you know the name of this thing? Name what thing? That holds a rocket in place before it takes off. Launch pad. No, is it like a galley? What is it? A gantry. Gantry! A gantry. Just when you have a sign and you're looking for the word,

[62:31]

you see the invitational characters right there, kind of like, yeah. And then there's going to be an essence. But if you can't find the word, sometimes it may be somewhat illuminating to say, I've got the sign, I've got the essence. Yeah. And being stopped there may be helpful for you during meditation to get to know the invitational character. I was wondering, is there some relation between the sign and specific characteristics versus general characteristics? It seems like that's what you're getting at with these questions, is that the sign always has to do with specific characteristics. There's not a generic image of something. Can you describe the chair? Can you address that? I think actually it was something he saw. The sign was a specific chair. It wasn't a generic image of a chair. So you're asking, is the sign more connected to the specific characters

[63:33]

rather than the general characters? That's what it seemed like, yeah. He said something to sit on. Well, yeah, that was, I don't know about that. Would that be the sign? Something that you sit on? That seems more like the general characteristics. Yeah. That's more like... Something you can sit on is... Actually, I said that. I agree that that was the sign, right? Yeah. But it actually is more of a... It is somewhat, in some sense, you might say more general, but not really. It's more like actually the Lakshmana, now that I think of it. It's more like the characteristic of a chair. Well, there's the Samanya Lakshmana, and then there's the Svalakshmana. Yeah, the general. It seems like we're using more like Svalakshmanas to make the sign from. Yeah, I think that may be right. I'm not saying the Svalakshana is a sign, though. You're not? No. Because that's what we can directly perceive, right?

[64:38]

You can't directly perceive a Samanya Lakshmana. A general characteristic. You can't directly perceive it, right. But, again, for a chair, the characteristic of the chair is different than the way you perceive it. So, again, for fire, you have a general characteristic of fire, but you don't necessarily perceive it by that general characteristic, or by the specific characteristic of it being burning right now, the way it's burning right now. It may not be the sign by which you know it. But isn't it going to be some specific characteristic? No, the fire will have a specific characteristic. And isn't that the way you're going to know it? That's not the sign, though. I don't think you know that the specific characteristic I'm saying is not the sign. How is it related? How is the nimitta related to the specific characteristic? It's related by... The nimitta is the image

[65:39]

of the burning, of the fire, the specific experience of being burned by fire, or of the burning. The specific, not general fire, quality of fire, is the specific own character of fire. It's the specific one, not general. But the sign of it, the image of it, is the sign. There's a connection between the characteristic and the sign. But the perception, the sign, is more important than the characteristic because the perception is the process that goes wacko. We don't have any problem being burned by fire and jumping away. But our process of designating fire makes it so that when we grasp the sign of the fire, the image of the fire, we associate it with words and essences. So it sounds like the image is actually a step beyond the specific characteristics.

[66:40]

It's another additional layer. Well, the image... The nimitta is not the Svaha Lakshana or the Samadhi Lakshana. It's neither the specific characteristic nor the general characteristic. It's like another layer almost added to it. Another layer added to it? Yes, but it's just... It's also the... It's the... It's the mind relating to it. The mind... The body gets burned by the fire or the body sits in the chair. But then Manas consults Alaya for an image of what just happened so we can talk about it. So it's not exactly another layer. It's just saying that the experience, our experience of sitting in a chair is never outside of this mental process which involves the projection of essence into this... into the physicality of the situation.

[67:42]

So the sign, you could say, is more like a mental version of the characteristic. A mental version of the characteristic? Yeah. Yes? I'm wondering about charades. Yes? Like, when you play charades, like, Alaya might be... Everyone has an idea of the essence and then you're acting out the signs and everyone tries to guess the word. Sounds okay so far. That's it. That would be an example. That would be an example? Of the imputation effect. That would be an example of finding it, is that... Yes. Is that you offer a sign. Right. You try to offer a sign. Right. In hopes that people would connect the sign to the word. By everyone. And then there would be this thing. Yeah. Yes? I'm calling on people who haven't been called on yet.

[68:43]

Yes? It seems to me that all of the signs that we dredge up are probably... Signs, by the way, are not dredged up. No. Signs are immediate experience. I thought they were retrieved. No. Then we make images of those signs. Signs are basically physical. They're coming up from Alaya too. Okay. Well, if we think of something like Wheelwright Center, then we come up with an image. We come up with some sort of a sign. But it seems like that sign or almost any other sign we come up with are always practically infinite combinations of other signs, which makes them kind of indefinable. So, there are so many ways to describe the Wheelwright Center, for instance, that you probably have to synthesize that storehouse of signs

[69:44]

to come up with one that relates to what you're calling Wheelwright Center, or Hammer, or anything else that you could name, so that there's never just one sign. Well, people want to raise their hand before I answer you, yes? In the history of philosophy, some philosophers have been concerned with what they call a representation, which roughly corresponds to sign. Some philosophers suggested that we see a fraction of the possible totality of the, what you might call, descriptors. And from that fraction,

[70:46]

we construct or fill in the totality and name the thing as such and such, or see the image of such and such. Does that make sense? The reason why I mention that is that several people have been seemingly perplexed about what is the sign? Is it this or that aspect? Is it a tiny little aspect? Is it just one feature? Is it several features? And so forth. So maybe that's what happens. We don't see the complete image. We only see a... We don't see a complete image? Well, we construct it in our minds.

[71:50]

We do see it, but we arrive at it from just a fraction of possible features. I understand that presentation, I think, somewhat. Yes. But I do think we can see an image. Just an... Not to say it's an image. Like an image of Fred is not always Fred. But I can see an image of Fred. And I could do a little... And that's an image of Fred. But I don't say that... I don't necessarily think that's Fred. It's just an image. You know, like I could have read plaid as an image of Fred from now on. If I wanted to. But I wouldn't think that's Fred. So I think we can have images and signs of things. Yes? It seems that when you say Wheelwright Center, the first thing I had was an image

[72:54]

based on where I was standing when you said... when I imagined imagining Wheelwright Center. So I was over near the tea house and I had enough of an image to get me there, to get me to the Wheelwright Center. And then the next image that came up for me was the image of the door, of opening that door there. And I'm wondering about the functionality of images so that, to me, a lot of the signs come from how I need to use the object or function with the object. And the more requirements of me, the more specific the image gets. They're related, I guess, and I don't know all the ways they're related, but I'm interested in the sign and the image being based on the function, the body and relationship to the chair or the Wheelwright Center. Maybe it doesn't hold true for all objects,

[73:58]

but I'm feeling a relationship of function and use and body and image and specificity. I think the answer is yes. Yes. Right now I'm feeling the pressure on the bottom of what I'm naming my foot. So I say the image is that sensation. I have an image of a sensation of pressure. I'm including the essence of foot. Essence of foot or essence of pressure? Well, each one as I get to each one. Okay. Yes? When I was six, I lived in East Africa, where I lived for a year in a house. When I was 18, I went back and my mother gave me a map of where the house was,

[75:01]

and the combined events of me and the map meant that I didn't find the house. So I was wandering around looking for it, and there was a smell that I knew as the house very, very clearly, but I couldn't get everything else to fit for quite a long time. It took a while for the other signs, particularly visual, for me to locate where the house was and where I was in relation to it, but the smell was really a very, very clear sign, and it took quite a while for the rest of the signs to fit in. Yes? I was thinking of listening to a symphony and hearing a particular sound and knowing it's cello, and the cello comes up. Mm-hmm. Is that an example? I think so. Yes? Or if one sees a cherry blossom,

[76:05]

a bud, I'm thinking freshness, beauty, light. Well, I thought before you said freshness, beauty, light that you already had seen a sign of cherry blossom and put the name cherry blossom. Didn't you say cherry blossom? Yes, if you see a cherry blossom. But what's the sign there? Which sign are you referring to? Well, isn't a cherry blossom a sign itself? Cherry blossom's a word. The other day I was over by the yurt, and somebody said, what kind of tree is that? I said, it's a cherry tree. I looked, and the flowers were white. So I said, no, I think it's a plum. So the white was a sign for me to connect it to plum rather than to cherry. Oh, so there's a season. And a season. Yeah.

[77:08]

There's the season, the time of the year, and the color of the flower. I said, I think it's a plum. Well, I was thinking of any blossom, any bud. Isn't that a sign? Any blossom is a sign. You see a blossom, it's a sign of what? A flower? Rebirth. Or a sign of rebirth. The imputation would be beauty, rebirth, freshness. The word would be that. The imputation refers, this imputation here refers to the essence upon the flower or whatever. It's just that we find this, the place we find this very important factor, this very important kind of thinking, we find it in association with signs and names. Signs and names we can find. We aren't so aware of the essence projected.

[78:11]

We need to find the essence projected. That's really the imputation. The sign and the name are not imputations. Those are different kinds of ideas. Those are other dependent phenomena. Signs and names are other dependent phenomena. They're a different type of thing than imputation. But the imputation is connected, is in association, or depends on, I should say, the names connected to the signs. So we're talking about different kinds of ideas. Names are ideas. Signs are ideas. They're dependent co-arisings. They're other dependent ideas. They're ideas which dependently co-arise. The imputational character dependently co-arises, but it's imputing non-dependent co-arising on the world. We're trying to find that. What about if somebody looks at you, a certain expression,

[79:12]

and you see anger? You're imputing anger to the person they're angry with. Well, you mean the person is not angry and you think they're angry? But the idea that they're angry, that's not the imputational character. The imputational character is you think there really is an essence to the anger. It is a problem to make mistakes like that. That's a problem in life too. But even when you're not making a mistake like that, you're still imputing essences. Yes? I was wondering about object relations theory in psychology and how it may be different or similar to the schema that you're describing. So, like in object relations, say you have like mother, somebody's mother, female, other, feminine, mother. Then I have my image of mother, and then there's an emotion that gets overlaid on that image

[80:15]

or the sets of images or whatever that I'm conjuring up for mother. How is that similar and different too? Yes. When you look at her and have this image of her, are you trying to conventionally designate that? I think that for me it's pre-conventional and that it would happen unconsciously. Like I would just assume that that's the way it is. With most things, anything would be... Even before the baby, according to this teaching, even before the baby can say mother, even before the baby has heard the word mother, when the baby looks at somebody,

[81:16]

the baby sees that somebody as though they were existing independently. And because they see the person that way, they will be able soon to designate that person as mother or something. The next time they see... Gradually, as they see that person, the sign of that person and the projection of essence on them will allow them to say mother or whatever, or not mother. The emotions that are overlaid come later. This process is the basic process that we're addressing as the source of affliction. Okay. And then the other day you had mentioned something about sitting in the Zen Do and being... I don't want to use the word stupid, but just letting things be there,

[82:21]

letting the rain be there, or something along those lines. Is that... Is that a way of being with things without believing the convention or experiencing the convention? That way of being with things is a way of training your attention. You attend to being that way, you turn your attention towards being that way, and if you can consistently be that way, this comes to fruit as tranquility. In the state of tranquility, or even also in the process of training that way, when you get good at it, the conceptual elaborations on these images which are connected to words, through projecting essences on them, the conceptual elaborations are subdued.

[83:23]

So it gets to be almost like you don't believe the essence. Because when we believe the essence that we project on things, that we talk about, when we believe the projection of essence, which we have to do in order to talk about, then the cognitive activity which arises from that is very disturbing. Either a little bit disturbing, or more than a little bit disturbing. When we reduce the cognitive elaboration, the conceptual elaboration of that image which we think has an essence, it's as though the disturbance which is caused by believing in the essence is eliminated temporarily, or subdued temporarily. That would be like we would be if we didn't believe it. Because if we don't believe the essence of things, we don't think about them in a disturbing way. When you see things and don't believe the essence

[84:27]

which your mind projects on them, your thinking is not disturbed. Then you can think about people in an undisturbing way, in an un-terminal way, in an un-miserable way. So if you just turn off your thinking about things, you get into a situation which is similar to the way you would be if you didn't believe essences. But initially, the turning off the conceptual elaboration is not intended to accomplish the whole task of refuting the appearance of inherent existence in things. You're not hoping, you're not necessarily expecting that that will be possible. Although it's very conducive to it. Usually there's more work to be done. Does that make sense? Yes. I just want to confirm something first, and then I have a question. So what you're saying is essences projected are very subjective.

[85:28]

Are they very subjective? Not really. No, because they're universal. Everybody projects essences... But they're subjective to me, though, with my filters. When you say Real Rights Center, I'm seeing Learning Center, and I'm not thinking of the building, because the building is completely suppressed now. The projection of essences, if you do it, it's your personal projection, but your essence is the same as my essence. All of our essences are the same. That's one concept which we all share, and it's the same concept for all of us. And for all of us, it's a total fantasy. Yeah. So we subjectively experience, I subjectively experience my projection of essence upon you, but my essence upon you is the same as your essence upon you, is the same as Linda's essence upon you, and the same as your essence upon me. All of our essence projections get identical. And equally inaccurate.

[86:29]

It isn't that a few people are projecting essences correctly. Because the basis is wrong. Because the basis is wrong, because it's totally fantasy. If you know it's a fantasy, you're not wrong. But the thing is, we project it on things that aren't independent, and that's an error. So there's no footing there at all. But the signs you're experiencing, those are your subjective, individual history, of producing this. So what happens with a foreign word? So I'll use two words. One is mangosteen. And maybe you can kind of break this to anything. Oh, mango and something. And then I could do something like rambutan, which has no, yeah, maybe... Spice. Connection to, okay. Connection to an English word. How would that get imputed? And how would this whole thinking come along? That would have, for me, it would have the sign,

[87:32]

perhaps it would have the sign of a word that I don't think is English. Okay. That's the imputation? That's the sign. That's part of the sign. Then I use the word, not English. Okay. Perhaps. Okay. But I won't, if I see this thing, if I see this image of, like, not English, if I see an image or a sign that I can't see as an English word, I won't put not English on that until I put an essence on it. Okay. We don't do that. Right. We don't put not English on something until we think it really is actually not English. Like, actually not English. Right, okay. But we do put that on, and we do it, and that's how we do it. And there's the imputational character. And then we believe that this thing really is what we projected on it. We think it really is not English. But, you know, Chinese is basically, you know,

[88:38]

it's not true to say Chinese is just not English. It's something more than not English, you know. And you're something more than not me. You know, you're the life beyond just not being me. But I can also conventionally designate you as not me. And you can understand that. But for me to think that's true, that that's what you are, this is a big problem. For me, at least. But since you're connected to me, it's a problem for you. And you want me to get over that. And open to you being far more than the way I talk about you, talk with you. That's what this training is about. Yes, Liz? I'm thinking about when conventional designations fail, like you say, please pick chard and someone picks kale. Yes. Pick chard and feel free, but if you're,

[89:39]

I have a conventional designation of feel free, and it's not shared. It's not the same conventional designation. There's a lot of affliction there. Maybe it's helpful in our shared life to kind of like try to be really clear about our signs. For me, feel free is to go past this building, and then there's feel free. I think it is very important to be clear about our signs. So studying signs is one of the definitions of the cultivation of wisdom. It's to study signs. To notice how you're working with signs is a very important skill. It's interesting that signs,

[90:42]

that we actually can have also shared, to have a shared conventional, to have a conventional designation that works. Yes. Some things you can work with conventional designations to get concepts that, everybody pretty much can work with green and purple to kind of meet. Even if they're green and they're purple, it's different. But it's a little harder with... Excuse me, guys. So you're using green or purple, right? Those are words, right? And the sign you're experiencing of green is not the sign that I'm experiencing of green.

[91:47]

Right. My experience of green is my body. Your experience of green is your body. We're looking at our bodies, you know, which a lion is connected to. So when you bring up the word green, and then you try to find out what sign you're going to use and I'm going to use, so we sort of both can use that word green. So I have this experience of this plant, and then what sign is there and can I use for green and you can use for green? And we work on that, and that's the plant. We agree that way. Or if it's more than green, if it's more complex, we have to work, and that's how we have conventional designations, but also it's how we help each other to pay attention to what's happening so we realize, you know, that actually we do have to check with our body experience all the time. It's interesting to me to think about, like, communicating about something like, you see that plant needs water

[92:47]

because the color on the leaf is different. It's not shiny, it's dull right now. Or it's got the color that indicates for that particular... Yeah, so how are they going to come up with the sign that will help them be able to see the color you want them to see? Yeah, I don't know. How are they going to come up with the sign that's going to help them relate to this plant in the way you want them to relate to it? And maybe you can agree on the same word for that thing, but the important thing is that they see this condition... That it stays to be seen, standing there together and seeing. That they can relate to it appropriately and successfully. That's what you want. And they might even use a different word, but that would make things complicated, but still, if they related to it the way you wanted to, you could live with that probably. Like, you might say something such a color, or they might say a different color, but you notice that they do just what you want them to do,

[93:48]

and you say, it's okay. I call it wilted. You call it smelly. But you do just what I want you to. So I think that's okay. And actually, you understand this thing like I do, too. But for some reason, you don't want to use the same word. But I can adjust to that and say that your word for that is my word for this. Like if you're working with someone from another country. Thank you.

[94:15]

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